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CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 26.1, corporate Defendants/Appellees state that
Backpage.com, LLC, Camarillo Holdings, LLC, and New Times Media, LLC are
Delaware limited liability companies and wholly owned subsidiaries of other
companies, which are privately held. No publicly held corporation owns any
interest in any of the Defendants/Appellees or their parent companies.
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ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Whether Plaintiffs’ claims are barred by Section 230 of the

Communications Decency Act (“CDA”), 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (“Section 230”),
because they are based on advertisements created and posted on Defendants’
Backpage.com website by third parties, where uniform case law holds that Section
230 immunizes websites from such claims.
2.

Whether Plaintiffs can circumvent Defendants’ Section 230 immunity

by attacking the “construct and operation” of the Backpage.com website as a
whole, despite this Circuit’s holding to the contrary in Universal Communication
Systems, Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 418 (1st Cir. 2007).
3.

Whether Plaintiffs’ civil claims for damages under 18 U.S.C. § 1595

state a claim, where every court to consider the question has held that Section 230
immunizes websites from civil claims based on federal criminal statutes, and in
any event Plaintiffs do not allege that Defendants knowingly participated in a
venture to victimize Plaintiffs.
4.

Whether Plaintiffs’ right-of-publicity claims were properly dismissed,

where they are not intellectual property claims exempt from immunity under
Section 230(e)(3) because they implicate only Plaintiffs’ privacy interests, and
where Plaintiffs do not allege that their likenesses were misappropriated by
Defendants for their own benefit.
1
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Whether Plaintiff Doe 3’s copyright claim fails as a matter of law

because she has not alleged any damages (and cannot plausibly do so) and also
because she cannot show Defendants took any volitional act, directly benefited, or
had knowledge sufficient to make out any claim for direct or secondary
infringement.

2

Case: 15-1724

Document: 00116911434

Page: 17

Date Filed: 11/02/2015

Entry ID: 5950178

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case concerns the proper application of Section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act, which bars claims against websites based on
content posted by third parties. 47 U.S.C. § 230. Plaintiffs are three young women
who allege that pimps trafficked them for sex through ads they posted on a
classified advertising website. Instead of bringing claims against the pimps and
others who exploited them, Plaintiffs have sued the website, Backpage.com.1
Applying the extensive case law interpreting Section 230, the district court
held Backpage.com immune from suit and dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims under Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The court rejected the Plaintiffs’ central premise: that they are
not suing Backpage.com for the ads concerning them but rather for “business
practices” or conduct of the website generally. Courts have repeatedly rejected
such “entire website” attacks as inconsistent with the substance and policy of
Section 230. Memorandum and Order (“Order,” attached in the Addendum
hereto), Add. 25-26. In particular, the district court followed this Court’s decision
in Lycos, 478 F.3d at 413, which held that a plaintiff cannot evade Section 230 by
“artful pleading” or by challenging the “construct and operation” of a website. Id.
at 418-19, 422.
1

Defendants-appellees Backpage.com, LLC; Camarillo Holdings, LLC; and New
Times Media, LLC, referred to collectively here as “Backpage.com,” were owners
and/or operators of the Backpage.com website at the time of the alleged events
underlying Plaintiffs’ claims.
3
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Factual Background
1.

Backpage.com

Backpage.com operates an online classified advertising service through
which users can post advertisements in a variety of categories, including local
places, buy/sell/trade, automotive, rentals, real estate, jobs, dating, adult, and
services. Appendix (“App.”) 29-30, ¶ 38; Backpage.com, LLC v. Cooper, 939 F.
Supp. 2d 805, 813 (M.D. Tenn. 2013). The site is organized geographically, by
state and municipality. App. 32, ¶ 41; Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 2d at 813. Users post
over three million ads every month, making Backpage.com the second-largest
online classified ad service in the country, after Craigslist. Backpage.com, LLC v.
McKenna, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1262, 1266 (W.D. Wash. 2012).
All ad content is provided by third-party users who input the content for
posting on the website using an automated interface. App. 38, ¶ 53. The website
does not dictate or require any content. Backpage.com does, however, take
extensive voluntary measures to police user posts. App. 26-28, ¶ 34; App. 39-40,
¶¶ 54-55; App. 41, ¶ 58 (screening). The site employs systems of automated
filtering and manual review to identify and preclude ads that violate its rules,
including ads for potential illegal activity. Backpage.com refers ads that may
indicate child exploitation to the National Center for Missing and Exploited
Children (“NCMEC”). See McKenna, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 1266-67.
4
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“Backpage.com also regularly works with local, state and federal law enforcement
officials by responding to subpoena requests, providing officials with Internet
search tools, and removing posts and blocking users at the request of officials.”
Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 2d at 814.
2.

Plaintiffs’ Allegations

Plaintiffs allege that pimps and their associates trafficked Plaintiffs for sex
via the Internet. App. 46, ¶ 71; App. 50, ¶ 90; App. 52, ¶ 100. According to the
Second Amended Complaint (“Complaint”), all ads about Plaintiffs were posted on
Backpage.com by the pimps, or by Plaintiffs or the pimps’ associates at the pimps’
direction. App. 46-47, ¶¶ 74, 75; App. 47, ¶¶ 78, 80; App. 48, ¶¶ 82, 83; App. 51,
¶¶ 93, 94; App. 52-53, ¶¶ 100, 101. Plaintiffs allege the ads included photos taken
by their “traffickers,” App. 49-50, ¶ 87; App. 51, ¶ 95; App. 53, ¶ 102, except Doe
3 alleges she took one photo of herself, which she registered with the U.S.
Copyright Office after this suit was filed. App. 61, ¶ 143.
Plaintiffs do not provide or quote any of the alleged ads about them, except
allegations about titles in certain otherwise unidentified ads about Doe 3. App. 5253, ¶ 101 (alleging they contained words such as “new,” “sweet,” and “playful”).
However, the Complaint makes clear (and Plaintiffs do not dispute) that all the
ads—text, titles, and photos—were written, created, and posted by the pimps
(directly or by one of their associates or Plaintiffs). App. 46, ¶ 75 (pimp
5
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“instructed Jane Doe No. 1 to post advertisements of herself”); App. 50, ¶ 88
(“traffickers advertised Jane Doe No. 1”); App. 51, ¶ 93 (Jane Doe 2’s “pimp or [a]
female who worked closely with him” posted ads), ¶ 94 (same); App. 52-53, ¶ 101
(“the traffickers drafted and posted an advertisement” about Jane Doe 3 and
“continued to post additional [ads]”). Plaintiffs do not allege that Backpage.com
itself created, developed, or required any of the content in Plaintiffs’ ads.
Plaintiffs’ other allegations amount to conclusory, non-factual attacks on the
website as a whole. For example, Plaintiffs admit Backpage.com works with and
receives support from law enforcement agencies, but then contend these efforts are
a ruse. See App. 24-29, ¶¶ 30-34, 36. They also acknowledge Backpage.com’s
program to monitor ads and refer suspect ads to NCMEC, but conclude these efforts
“appear[] to be merely superficial.” App. 27, ¶ 34(iii). Plaintiffs admit the website
uses automated filtering to block improper ads, but then denigrate this screening
and assert Backpage.com should use different measures. App. 27-28, ¶ 34(iv); App.
36-37, ¶¶ 49-50; App. 40-41, ¶¶ 56, 57; App. 26, ¶ 58 (asserting site’s protections
are “deceitful”).
B.

Plaintiffs’ Complaint
Plaintiffs filed suit on October 16, 2014. They assert claims under: (1) 18

U.S.C. § 1595, a provision of the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization
Act (“TVPRA”) allowing civil damage claims based on criminal violations of 18
6
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U.S.C. § 1591; (2) the Massachusetts Anti-Trafficking Act (“MATA”), G. L. c.
265, § 50(d); (3) Massachusetts’ consumer protection law, G.L. c. 93A, § 9; (4) the
Massachusetts and Rhode Island right-of-publicity statutes, Mass. G. L. c. 214,
§ 3A and R.I. St. § 9-1-28.1; and (5) the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101, et seq.
App. 54-62. The Complaint describes Plaintiffs’ injuries from having been
exploited by pimps and then alleges, for all claims, that Backpage.com should be
held responsible.2
C.

The District Court’s Dismissal Order
On January 16, 2015, Backpage.com moved to dismiss the Complaint

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The district court allowed the motion in a 34page order.
The district court agreed with Backpage.com “that because the Doe plaintiffs
allege they were harmed by the contents of postings that defendants had no part in
creating, the claims fall squarely within Congress’s exemption of interactive
computer service providers from liability for third-party Internet content.” Add. 9.

2

Backpage.com recognizes the Court must accept Plaintiffs’ well-pleaded fact
allegations under Rule 12(b)(6). But, to be clear, Backpage.com vehemently
denies Plaintiffs’ accusations, which on the whole are not fact allegations but
conclusory arguments that should be disregarded. As other courts have found, see
Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 2d at 813-14; McKenna, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 1266-67,
Backpage.com makes extensive efforts to block improper ads, cooperate with law
enforcement, and combat trafficking and other illegal conduct—actions
unparalleled by other online providers in the U.S.
7
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The court rejected, in turn, every one of Plaintiffs’ efforts to avoid or plead around
Section 230 immunity.
Recognizing Congress’s purpose in Section 230 to promote Internet free
speech and self-policing, the court rejected Plaintiffs’ argument that the law “no
longer has the assuasive force that it may once have had.” Add. 11. Indeed, “far
from lowering the immunity bar, [Congress] has ratcheted it up” in recent years
“by expanding the scope of section 230 immunity.” Add. 11-12 (2010 amendment
to 28 U.S.C. § 4102(c)(1) extended Section 230 immunity to inconsistent foreign
judgments).3
The court rejected Plaintiffs’ argument that their claim under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1595 is exempt from Section 230 because Section 230(e)(1) exempts only federal
criminal prosecutions. Add. 22. The court dismissed Plaintiffs’ c. 93A claim both
under Section 230 immunity and for the additional reason that Plaintiffs’ theory of
causation—that were it not for Backpage.com’s representations about its
cooperation with law enforcement, the pimps never would have abused Plaintiffs—
“is too speculative … as a matter of law.” Id. at 25. The court concluded as to
Plaintiffs’ right-of-publicity claims that, even if they amounted to “intellectual

Though Plaintiffs waived any contention that Backpage.com lost immunity by
acting as an “information content provider,” Plaintiffs’ amici raised the issue
regardless, and the district court correctly rejected it. Add. 14. The challenged
practices of Backpage.com “amount to neither affirmative participation in an
illegal venture nor active content creation,” the court ruled. Add. 14.
3

8
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property” claims exempt under Section 230(e)(3), Plaintiffs did not allege
Backpage.com “used their images to extract any direct benefit.” Id. at 30. Finally,
the court dismissed Doe 3’s copyright claim, because she failed to allege any
actual damages or profits to Backpage.com attributable to the allegedly infringing
photo. Id. at 32.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Congress enacted Section 230 to encourage the unfettered and unregulated
development of free speech and commerce on the Internet. Recognizing that it is a
practical impossibility for websites and other online providers to screen all of the
millions of user-submitted posts or ensure none are harmful, Section 230 instead
encourages self-policing, while immunizing websites for claims based on thirdparty content and preempting any state law claims to the contrary. 47 U.S.C.
§§ 230(c)(1), (e)(3). Congress rejected a legal regime that would allow liability
against websites for user content, recognizing that such an approach would not just
chill but freeze online speech. Instead, in passing Section 230, Congress chose to
immunize websites from claims based on third-party content and preempt any state
or local law that would otherwise allow such claims.
Section 230 provides a simple framework to accomplish its purposes.
Pursuant to a three-prong test (discussed in Section II.B, infra), if a claim against a
website arises from third-party content, the claim is barred. In other words, if an
9
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online provider does not create or require the specific content that allegedly caused
a plaintiff’s harms, the website is immune from liability and the plaintiff’s claims
must be dismissed. This has been the consistent interpretation of Section 230 in
hundreds of decisions over the last twenty years. Here, Plaintiffs admit that third
parties created the online ads that caused the harm alleged, and they do not contend
that Backpage.com had anything to do with their development. This resolves the
application of Section 230 immunity. Plaintiffs’ claims are barred.
Plaintiffs nonetheless attempt to evade Section 230 by insisting they do not
seek to “impute” their specific ads to Backpage.com, but instead challenge the
website for “encourag[ing] . . . illegal advertisements,” “impeding the detection
and identification of sex traffickers” by cooperating with law enforcement but only
in a “superficial” way (efforts that Plaintiffs label as “lying”) and otherwise
“evad[ing] public scrutiny.” Appellants’ Brief (“App. Br.”) at 8, 23. This attempt
to plead around Section 230 immunity has already been rejected by this Court and
many others. “No amount of artful pleading can avoid” Section 230. Lycos, 478
F.3d at 418.
Plaintiffs otherwise seek to avoid Section 230 by misapplying the law’s
exemptions for enforcement of federal criminal laws and intellectual property
claims. However, as the district court correctly held, (1) Plaintiffs cannot invoke
the Section 230(e)(1) exemption for federal criminal prosecutions by asserting civil
10
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claims based on criminal statutes, (2) Plaintiffs’ right-of-publicity claims are not
intellectual property claims at all (but even if they were, they do not state a claim);
and (3) Doe 3’s copyright claim fails as a matter of law because Backpage.com
never used or profited from her photo.
Section 230 reflects Congress’s considered policy decision that Plaintiffs
may “hold liable the person who creates or develops unlawful content, but not the
interactive computer service provider that merely enables that content to be posted
online.” Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 254
(4th Cir. 2009). As a matter of law and as the district court correctly held,
Plaintiffs may not sue Backpage.com, because the website is immune under
Section 230 from liability for third-party content.
ARGUMENT
I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews a district court’s allowance of a motion to dismiss de

novo. Garcia-Catalan v. United States, 734 F.3d 100, 102 (1st Cir. 2013). Under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007)). While the Court must accept factual allegations and reasonable
inferences in favor of a plaintiff, it must separate such allegations from
11
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“conclusory statements … to analyze whether the former, if taken as true, set forth
a plausible, not merely a conceivable, case for relief.” Juarez v. Select Portfolio
Servicing, Inc., 708 F.3d 269, 276 (1st Cir. 2013) (quotations omitted).
In this case, the Court should also consider the intent of Section 230 that
claims against online providers based on third-party content should be dismissed at
the earliest possible opportunity, to avoid “costly and protracted legal battles.”
Nemet Chevrolet, 591 F.3d at 259 (“[I]mmunity is an immunity from suit rather
than a mere defense to liability [and] is effectively lost if a case is erroneously
permitted to go to trial.”); Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v.
Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1174 (9th Cir. 2008); accord Jones v. Dirty
World Ent. Rec. LLC, 755 F.3d 398, 417 (6th Cir. 2014); see also Lycos, 478 F.3d
at 413 (affirming 12(b)(6) dismissal based on Section 230 immunity).
II.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT SECTION 230
BARS PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS.
A.

Section 230 Protects Free Speech by Shielding Websites from
Claims Based on Content Posted by Third Parties.

Section 230(c)(1) of the CDA unambiguously bars suits against websites and
other online providers based on content provided by third parties: “No provider …
of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of
any information provided by another information content provider.” 47 U.S.C.
§ 230(c)(1). An “information content provider” under the statute is a person
12
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“responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of information.”
Id. § 230(f)(3). A website loses immunity only if it “create[s]” or “develop[s]” the
allegedly unlawful content itself. In addition to barring federal claims,4 Section
230 expressly preempts state laws: “[N]o liability may be imposed under any State
or local law that is inconsistent with this section.” Id. § 230(e)(3). Section 230
provides limited exceptions for federal criminal prosecutions and intellectual
property laws. Id. §§ 230(e)(1), (2).
Congress enacted Section 230 to achieve two goals. First, it “wanted to
encourage the unfettered and unregulated development of free speech on the
Internet, and to promote the development of e-commerce.” Batzel v. Smith, 333
F.3d 1018, 1027 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co. v. Am.
Online Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 985 n.3 (10th Cir. 2000) (Section 230 is meant “to
promote freedom of speech”); 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2) (Section 230 is intended to
“preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the
Internet”). Second, it sought to encourage online providers to “self-police” for
potentially harmful or offensive material by providing immunity for such efforts.
Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1028; see also 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2).

4

See, e.g., Chicago Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law v. Craigslist,
Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 668-69 (7th Cir. 2008) (Section 230 precluded claim under the
federal Fair Housing Act).
13
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As this Court has observed, Congress made a “policy choice … not to deter
harmful online speech through the … route of imposing tort liability on companies
that serve as intermediaries for other parties’ potentially injurious messages.”
Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d at 418 (quoting Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 33031 (4th Cir. 1997)). Congress sought to eliminate the “obvious chilling effect” that
liability of online providers would cause, “given the volume of material
communicated through [the Internet], the difficulty of separating lawful from
unlawful speech, and the relative lack of incentives to protect lawful speech.” Id.
at 418-19 (quoting Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331). Put more simply, “Section 230 . . .
sought to prevent lawsuits from shutting down websites.” Batzel, 333 F.3d at
1028. To be sure, Congress recognized that some material on the Internet could be
harmful, and in Section 230 it left open a remedy: “[P]laintiffs may hold liable the
person who creates or develops unlawful content, but not the interactive computer
service provider who merely enables that content to be posted online.” Nemet
Chevrolet, 591 F.3d at 254.
Consistent with Section 230’s terms and Congress’s policy, this Court has
observed that “Section 230 immunity should be broadly construed.” Lycos, 478
F.3d at 419. Every other circuit to consider the issue has likewise held that Section

14
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230 establishes broad immunity for online providers.5 State courts have said the
same—one noted that some 300 reported decisions have interpreted Section 230,
and “[a]ll but a handful … find that the website is entitled to immunity from
liability.” Hill v. StubHub, Inc., 727 S.E.2d 550, 558 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012).
B.

The District Court Correctly Dismissed Plaintiffs’ Claims Under
Section 230’s Test.

Section 230 sets forth a three-part test, as this Court has recognized. A
website or other online service provider is immune from suit if “(1) [it] is a
‘provider or user of an interactive computer service’; (2) the claim is based on
‘information provided by another information content provider’; and (3) the claim
would treat [the website] ‘as the publisher or speaker’ of that information.” Lycos,
478 F.3d at 418 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1)).
5

See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330-31; Ben Ezra, 206 F.3d at 985 n.3; Green v. Am.
Online, 318 F.3d 465, 471 (3d Cir. 2003); Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339
F.3d 1119, 1123-24 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting a “consensus” that “§ 230(c) provides
broad immunity for publishing content provided primarily by third parties”);
Almeida v. Amazon.com, Inc. 456 F.3d 1316, 1321 (11th Cir. 2006) (“federal
circuits have interpreted [Section 230] to establish broad federal immunity to any
cause of action that would make service providers liable for information
originating with a third-party user” (internal citations and quotations omitted));
Johnson v. Arden, 614 F.3d 785, 791 (8th Cir. 2010) (same); Doe v. MySpace, Inc.,
528 F.3d 413, 418 (5th Cir. 2008) (“Courts have construed the immunity
provisions in § 230 broadly…”); Chicago Lawyers’ Comm., 519 F.3d at 671 (7th
Cir. 2008), as amended (May 2, 2008); Jones, 755 F.3d at 406-07 (6th Cir. 2014);
Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1359 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Ricci v. Teamsters
Union Local 456, 781 F.3d 25, 28 (2d Cir. 2015) (“join[ing] consensus” that the
term “interactive computer service” should be “construed broadly to effectuate the
statute’s speech-protective purpose”).
15
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This test is straightforward by design, to provide clarity to online providers
and others. See Jones, 755 F.3d at 415 (“muddiness” of a test based on whether
websites “encouraged” unlawful content would defeat Congress’s purposes). The
test comes down to determining whether a plaintiff’s claims arise or stem from
third-party content, however the claims are labeled or characterized. See MySpace,
528 F.3d at 418; Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1101-02 (9th Cir. 2009)
(“[W]hat matters is not the name of the cause of action [but] whether [it] inherently
requires the court to treat the defendant as the ‘publisher or speaker’ of the content
provided by another.”). The test turns on “the specific content that was the source
of the alleged liability” and who created and developed that content. FTC v.
Accusearch, Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 1198-99 (10th Cir. 2009); accord Jones, 755
F.3d at 409 (“immunity under the CDA depends on the pedigree of the content at
issue”); Gentry v. eBay, Inc., 99 Cal. App. 4th 816, 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 703, 717 n.11
(2002) (allegations that a website operator provides some content are “irrelevant if
[it] did not itself create or develop the content for which the [plaintiffs] seek to
hold it liable”).
Plaintiffs do not dispute that the first prong of the test is met:
Backpage.com, as a website operator, is a “provider … of an interactive computer
service.” See Lycos, 478 F.3d at 419. Plaintiffs also do not contest that their
claims are based on “information provided by another information content
16
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provider.” Nor could they, given their allegations that they were victimized “as the
result” of ads created and posted by the pimps or persons the pimps directed
(including Plaintiffs themselves). See App. 50, ¶ 89 (Doe 1); App. 52, ¶ 99 (Doe
2); App. 53, ¶ 103 (Doe 3). Further, the Complaint does not allege, nor could it,
that Backpage.com had anything to do with creating or developing the ad content.6
1.

Plaintiffs Seek to Hold Backpage.com Liable as the
Publisher of the Pimps’ Ads.

Plaintiffs base their effort to avoid Section 230 on the third element of the
test—they maintain “[t]he CDA issue presented by this appeal” is “whether
Plaintiffs’ claims, as pled, ‘treat’ Backpage ‘as the publisher or speaker of content
provided by another.’” App. Br. at 29 (emphasis in original).7 The answer is a
simple “yes.” The breadth of Section 230’s immunity for “publisher” liability is

6

Plaintiffs also do not allege Backpage.com required unlawful content or retained
others to create and post content—the two circumstances in which circuit courts
have held that providers fell outside Section 230. See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at
1166-68, 1172 n.33, 1174 (roommate-matching website responsible for developing
content as to portion of site requiring users to provide discriminatory preferences,
but immune as to section allowing users to post comments of their own choosing);
Accusearch, Inc., 570 F.3d at 1192, 1199-1200 (website responsible for developing
content because it sold private telephone records and hired researchers to obtain
them, which required violating or circumventing laws).
7

As noted, plaintiffs admit that the ads at issue were created and posted by thirdparties, so the only way plaintiffs can assert causation or standing to sue
Backpage.com would be because it published the ads. As the district court
correctly observed, there can be no “nexus” for plaintiffs’ claims against
Backpage.com “[w]ithout the offending ads.” Add. 25.
17
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well-established in the case law and squarely applies to Plaintiffs’ claims,
regardless of how they label them.
The relevant question under this prong of the Section 230 test is whether a
plaintiff’s claims “arise or stem” from third-party content, regardless of how those
claims may be labeled or phrased. Hinton v. Amazon.com.dedc, LLC, 72 F. Supp.
3d 685, 690 (S.D. Miss. 2014) (internal quotation omitted). In fact, courts
“repeatedly have rejected attempts to recharacterize claims fundamentally based on
the posting of online information in order to avoid § 230’s prohibition on
‘treat[ing] [the defendant] as a “publisher” of information.’” Goddard v. Google,
Inc., No. C-08-2738, 2008 WL 5245490, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2008).
In Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413 (5th Cir. 2008), for example, a 14year-old girl and her mother sued MySpace.com after the girl created a profile on
the site (lying about her age) and met a man who sexually assaulted her. The
plaintiffs insisted their claims “[did] not attempt to treat” MySpace “as a ‘publisher’
of information,” but instead were “predicated solely on [its] failure to implement
basic safety measures to protect minors.” Id. at 419. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the
district court’s dismissal, finding that the plaintiffs’ arguments were “disingenuous”
“artful pleading”:
It is quite obvious the underlying basis of Plaintiffs’ claims is that,
through postings on MySpace, [the assailant] and Julie Doe met and
exchanged personal information which eventually led to an in-person
meeting and the sexual assault of Julie Doe. If MySpace had not
18

Case: 15-1724

Document: 00116911434

Page: 33

Date Filed: 11/02/2015

Entry ID: 5950178

published communications between Julie Doe and [the assailant],
including personal contact information, Plaintiffs assert they never
would have met and the sexual assault never would have occurred.
No matter how artfully Plaintiffs seek to plead their claims, the Court
views Plaintiffs’ claims as directed toward MySpace in its publishing,
editorial, and/or screening capacities.
Id. at 419-420 (holding plaintiffs’ allegations were “merely another way of claiming
that [the website] is liable for publishing the communications and they speak to [its]
role as a publisher of online third-party-generated content”). Numerous other
Section 230 cases are to the same effect.8
Plaintiffs offer dictionary definitions and their view of “historical context” to
suggest there is (or should be) some ambiguity about when a website is being

8

See, e.g., Green, 318 F.3d at 471 (affirming dismissal where “fundamental tort
claim is that AOL was negligent in promulgating harmful content”); Goddard v.
Google, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1201 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (claims fundamentally
rested on Google’s “general content policy”); Beckman v. Match.com, No. 2:13CV-97 JCM NJK, 2013 WL 2355512, at *6 (D. Nev. May 29, 2013) (“Plaintiff’s
claims … are actually challenging the publication of the profile of a third-party user
…, which is clearly immune”); Gibson v. Craigslist, Inc., No. 08-Civ.-7735 (RMB),
2009 WL 1704355, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 15, 2009) (rejecting claims that Craigslist
failed to police website for illegal gun sales, as it was “clear that Plaintiff’s claims
are directed toward Craigslist as a ‘publisher’ of third party content and Section 230
specifically proscribes liability in such circumstances” (internal quotation omitted));
Doe v. SexSearch.com, 502 F. Supp. 2d 719, 727 (N.D. Ohio 2007) (“At the end of
the day … Plaintiff is seeking to hold SexSearch liable for its publication of thirdparty content and harms flowing from [its] dissemination.”), aff’d, 551 F.3d 412
(6th Cir. 2008); Saponaro v. Grindr, LLC, No. CIV. 14-04522 JBS/AM, 2015 WL
1137870, at *3 (D.N.J. Mar. 13, 2015) (website immune where it allegedly failed to
enforce age verification, leading to sexual encounter involving a 13-year-old).
19
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“treated as a publisher” for claims based on third-party content. App. Br. at 30-35.9
But Plaintiffs’ suggestions are not the law, and the law is clear. “[Section] 230
forbids the imposition of publisher liability on a service provider for the exercise of
its editorial and self-regulatory functions” about whether to allow or block content.
Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331. “[A]ny activity that can be boiled down to deciding
whether to exclude material that third parties seek to post online is perforce immune
under section 230.” Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1170–71; see also Green, 318
F.3d at 471 (3d Cir. 2003) (AOL immune from claims based on “decisions relating
to monitoring, screening, and deletion of content from its network”). Thus,
Backpage.com’s posting rules and restrictions, its monitoring of user-submitted ads,
and its efforts to block and remove improper ads are quintessential publisher
functions immune under Section 230—indeed, they are self-policing of the sort
Congress expressly intended to encourage. Likewise, a website’s policies and
practices (and decisions not to change them) are “as much an editorial decision

9

Largely ignoring the case law making plain that the “publisher” functions
immune under Section 230 include all decisions about allowing or disallowing
content or structuring a website (discussed above), Plaintiffs contend that to trigger
immunity, a “claim must either impute the allegedly harmful content to the
defendant … or otherwise seek to attach liability to the act or process of publishing
the content.” App. Br. at 33. Plaintiffs do not explain what this sort of liability
would look like, nor even why their claims do not meet the very test they concoct.
In any event, no case has ever adopted Plaintiffs’ proposed construction of the
third prong of Section 230 immunity.
20
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[immune within publisher functions under Section 230] as a decision not to delete a
particular posting.” Lycos, 478 F.3d at 422.
Seeking to show their claims “do not ‘treat’ Backpage ‘as a publisher’ at all,”
Plaintiffs list several instances of what they allege constituteS a purportedly illicit
“course of conduct.” App. Br. at 39. However, all of these activities, when
stripped of Plaintiffs’ hyperbole, are publisher functions, i.e., “decisions about how
to treat postings generally.” Lycos, 478 F.3d at 422. For example, Plaintiffs
challenge Backpage.com’s automated filters to prevent improper terms in ads
(which Plaintiffs call “steering traffickers toward advertising language,” App. Br. at
39), but decisions to screen and block ads are precisely what Congress meant to
encourage in Section 230. Plaintiffs assail Backpage.com’s acceptance of “nontraditional payment methods” such as prepaid cards and Bitcoin, but establishing
conditions of publication (such as payment) is a publisher function and many online
entities accept non-traditional and newly developed forms of payment. As the
district court put it, “accepting payments from anonymous sources in Bitcoins,
peppercorns, or whatever, might have been made illegal by Congress, but it was
not.” Add. 15. Plaintiffs allege Backpage.com “strips” metadata from photographs
uploaded by users to the site, App. Br. at 39, and while the allegation is not true,10 it

Rather, when users upload photos to Backpage.com—whether to sell household
items, for dating, or in any other category—the photos are automatically resized so
they can appear on the site, and this automated process does not capture metadata.
10
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is a common practice for websites (including Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, and
Craigslist) not to retain metadata, as the district court recognized. Add. 15.
Plaintiffs vaguely assert Backpage.com “intentionally remov[ed] law enforcement’s
‘sting’ advertisements,” App. Br. at 39 (while failing to allege when that ever
happened and disregarding that Backpage.com routinely cooperates with law
enforcement operations)–but removing ads that violate the website’s rules (even
ones posted by law enforcement) is an editorial function protected by Section 230.
Despite Plaintiffs’ efforts to recharacterize their claims, they fundamentally
seek to hold Backpage.com liable for publishing (including failing to block) the
third-party ads that Plaintiffs contend resulted in their harm. See, e.g., App. 50,
¶ 89 (alleging Doe 1 was abused “as the result of … advertisements placed on
Backpage.com”); App. 51, ¶ 94 (Doe 2 was harmed “[a]s a result of …
advertisements” about her). Absent the advertisements, Plaintiffs have no
connection to Backpage.com and no standing to sue Backpage.com. See M.A. ex
rel. P.K. v. Vill. Voice Media Holdings, LLC, 809 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1047 (E.D. Mo.
2011) (“absent the content of [the] postings” advertising plaintiff, she “would lack
the injury in fact required for Article III standing” in action against Backpage.com).
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Plaintiffs’ Attempt to Characterize Their Claims as
Challenging “Business Practices” Cannot Override Section
230 Immunity.

Plaintiffs argue their claims are based on the Backpage.com website and its
conduct generally, not on “the act of communicating the advertisements” of
Plaintiffs. App. Br. at 37. But this Court and many others have long rejected the
stratagem of attacking a website as a whole to avoid Section 230.
First and foremost, this Court’s decision in Lycos forecloses Plaintiffs’
position. 478 F.3d 413. There, a corporate plaintiff claimed websites operated by
Lycos published inaccurate, disparaging comments about the company’s financial
condition and prospects. The plaintiff claimed Lycos fell outside Section 230
because it “involved itself with its subscriber[s’] conduct/activities and/or rendered
culpable assistance through the construct and operation of its web site” and
“actively induce[d] its subscribers to post unlawful content.” 478 F.3d at 420-21.
The Court characterized this as “artful pleading” and concluded the claims “fit[]
comfortably within the immunity intended by Congress.” Id. at 418-19. The
opinion noted that a website’s policies and practices (and decisions not to change
them) are “as much an editorial decision [immunized under Section 230] as a
decision not to delete a particular posting.” Id. at 422. Moreover, “message board
postings do not cease to be ‘information provided by another information content
provider’ merely because the ‘construct and operation’ of the web site might have
23
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some influence on the content of the postings.” Id. “If the cause of action is one
that would treat the service provider as the publisher of a particular posting,
immunity applies not only for the service provider’s decisions with respect to that
posting, but also for its inherent decisions about how to treat postings generally.”
Id. at 422.
Many cases have followed Lycos, rejecting efforts to evade Section 230 by
challenges to the “structure and design” of a website or allegations that a site
solicits content. See Nemet Chevrolet, 591 F.3d at 256-58; see also S.C. v. Dirty
World, LLC, 2012 WL 3335284, at *4 (W.D. Mo. Mar. 12, 2012) (rejecting
allegations about “the general structure and operation of the Website” because “the
CDA focuses on the specific post at issue”). As the district court correctly
recognized, Lycos and other cases “have repeatedly rejected this ‘entire website’
theory as inconsistent with the substance and policy of section 230,” which focuses
solely on who was responsible for the specific harmful material at issue. Add. 25.
See Hill, 727 S.E.2d at 562 (rejecting arguments that StubHub is designed to enable
illegal ticket scalping, and noting that an “‘entire website’ approach is fatally
flawed”).
Plaintiffs’ attempt to recast their claims as relating to a supposed “market
share growth scheme” of Backpage.com, see, e.g., App. Br. at 7, is but a variation
on the rejected “entire website” approach. Indeed, the court in M.A., 809 F. Supp.
24
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2d 1041 (E.D. Mo. 2011), rejected the same argument and enforced Section 230
immunity for claims identical to the ones here. In that case, the plaintiff alleged
Backpage.com had created “a highly tuned marketing site” with “the veil of
legality,” but “had a desire” that pimps “accomplish[] their nefarious illegal
prostitution activities so [they would] pay for more posting,” and thus was “an aider
and abettor of minor sex trafficking by virtue of [its] culpable conduct.” Id. at
1045, 1053. Relying on Lycos, the court in M.A. rejected the plaintiff’s challenges
to the site’s “construct and operation,” id. at 1050 (quoting Lycos, 478 F.3d at 42021), observing that a website is “immune under § 230 unless it created the offending
ads.” Id. at 1051. Similarly, it was “immaterial” that Backpage.com allegedly
“elicit[ed] online content for profit”; what matters is whether the website or third
parties create the content at issue. Id. at 1050 (quotation omitted). The court also
rejected M.A.’s assertion that she was not seeking to hold Backpage.com liable as a
publisher but “as an aider and abettor.” Id. at 1053-54 (rejecting a civil claim under
18 U.S.C. § 2255 based on alleged violation of federal criminal law; see Section III
infra).
Plaintiffs attempt to get around the protections of Section 230 by adding
adjectives to their allegations, claiming Backpage.com’s actions are “purposeful”
and “calculated,” rather than “neutral.” App. Br. at 38-40. This tack is unavailing.
In Jones v. Dirty World, for example, the plaintiff sued a gossip website
25
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(TheDirty.com) for disparaging remarks about her posted by a third-party user.
Jones v. Dirty World Entm't Recordings, LLC, 965 F. Supp. 2d 818 (E.D. Ky.
2013). The district court refused to apply Section 230 because it concluded the site
“intentionally encourage[d] illegal or actionable third-party postings,” id. at 821,
but the Sixth Circuit reversed. 755 F.3d at 414. It noted that “[m]any websites not
only allow but also actively invite and encourage users to post particular types of
content,” which might be “unwelcome to others.” Id. However, the court held such
websites cannot be sued on an “encouragement” theory because that would
“eclips[e] the immunity from publisher-liability that Congress established.” Id.
“Congress envisioned an uninhibited, robust, and wide-open internet … but the
muddiness of an encouragement rule would cloud that vision.” Id. at 415.
Jones follows the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Roommates.com, 521 F.3d
1157, finding a website immune from claims based on a section providing an opentext field for user comments (analogizing this to Craigslist, id. at 1172 n.33, which
is structured the same as Backpage.com). The court rejected the argument that the
site encouraged subscribers to make unlawful discriminatory statements, noting
that in many cases “a clever lawyer could argue that something the website
operator did encouraged the illegality,” but such cases “must be resolved in favor
of immunity, lest we cut the heart out of section 230 by forcing websites to face
death by ten thousand duck-bites, fighting off claims that they promoted or
26
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encouraged—or at least tacitly assented—to the illegality of third parties.” Id. at
1174. As the Ninth Circuit cautioned, “in cases of enhancement by implication or
development by inference—such as with respect to the ‘Additional Comments’
here—section 230 must be interpreted to protect websites not merely from ultimate
liability, but from having to fight costly and protracted legal battles.” Id. at 117475. Many other cases have similarly rejected “encouragement” arguments. As one
said, “there is simply no authority for the proposition that [encouraging unlawful
content] makes the website operator responsible, in whole or in part, for the
creation of every post on the site.” Ascentive, LLC v. Opinion Corp., 842 F. Supp.
2d 450, 476 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (quotation omitted).11
3.

Plaintiffs’ Additional Attempts to Evade Section 230 Are
Similarly Unavailing.

The balance of Plaintiffs’ arguments to avoid Section 230 can be addressed
summarily.

11

See also, e.g., S.C. v. Dirty World, 2012 WL 3335284, at *4 (“[E]ncouraging
defamatory posts is not sufficient to defeat CDA immunity.”); Goddard, 640 F.
Supp. 2d at 1196 (Google immune despite allegations it “encourages[,] collaborates
in the development of [and] effectively, requires [illegal content]” in ad program);
Global Royalties, Ltd. v. Xcentric Ventures, LLC, 544 F. Supp. 2d 929, 933 (D.
Ariz. 2008) (ripoffreport.com immune despite allegations it encouraged defamatory
reviews for financial benefit); Shiamili v. Real Estate Grp. of New York, Inc., 17
N.Y.3d 281, 290, 952 N.E.2d at 1018 (2011) (rejecting claims that
ShittyHabitats.com “encouraged users to post negative comments about the New
York City real estate industry”).
27

Case: 15-1724

Document: 00116911434

a.

Page: 42

Date Filed: 11/02/2015

Entry ID: 5950178

Preemption. Plaintiffs contend that “Congress did not intend to

completely ‘occupy the field’ of regulation of internet communications,” and the
Court should apply to Section 230 a “‘presumption against preemption’ limiting the
displacement of state law.” App. Br. at 44-45. However, Plaintiffs are attempting
to invoke principles that apply to implied preemption, while Section 230 imposes
express preemption. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 334 (holding that in Section 230,
Congress’s “exercise of its commerce power is clear” and “explicitly stated”);
McKenna, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 1272 (Section 230 preempted state law both expressly
and because the law would conflict with Congress’s purposes); Cooper, 939 F.
Supp. 2d at 823 (same). While Plaintiffs suggest a “narrow reading” should be
given to the “outer limits” of an express preemption provision, this case falls within
the heart of Section 230. As in Lycos, Plaintiffs’ allegations about Backpage.com’s
“conduct in operating the . . . web site fit[] comfortably within the immunity
intended by Congress.” Lycos, 478 F.3d at 419.
b.

“Content Creation.” Plaintiffs assert now that the district court

“should have permitted discovery to proceed on other aspects of [their] claims,”
specifically whether Backpage.com itself in some way created the content of the ads
about Plaintiffs. App. Br. at 46. But Plaintiffs expressly did not raise this argument
in the district court, see App. 236 (stating that whether Backpage.com is a “content
provider” is “not an aspect of the case upon which [Plaintiffs] are defending this
28
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motion to dismiss”). Plaintiffs may not raise a legal theory now that they expressly
abandoned in the district court. See Pomerleau v. West Springfield Public Schools,
362 F.3d 143, 146 (1st Cir. 2004) (“If any principle is settled in this circuit, it is
that, absent the most extraordinary circumstances, legal theories not raised squarely
in the lower court cannot be broached for the first time on appeal.”).12
c.

Affirmative Defense. Plaintiffs further contend that Section 230

provides only “an affirmative defense” to liability, “not immunity from suit itself,”
and thus the application of Section 230 should have been addressed on “a more
complete record.” App. Br. at 47-48. Notwithstanding that Plaintiffs said the
opposite in the district court, see Dkt. No. 25 at 21, 23 (referring to the CDA’s
“immunity provisions”), the uniform case law under Lycos and in every other

12

Plaintiffs also cite a Washington decision, J.S. v. Village Voice Media Holdings,
LLC, No. 90510-0, 2015 WL 5164599 (Wash. Sept. 3, 2015), affirming a trial
court’s refusal to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims under that state’s Rule 12(b)(6)
standard, which rejects Iqbal and Twombly and instead allows claims to proceed
based on a plaintiff’s hypothetical allegations. See McCurry v. Chevy Chase Bank,
FSB, 169 Wash. 2d 96, 233 P.3d 861, 864 (2010) (rejecting Twombly); Trujillo v.
Nw. Tr. Servs., Inc., 183 Wash. 2d 820, 355 P.3d 1100, 1105 (2015) (“We may
even consider hypothetical facts to determine if dismissal is proper.”). In any
event, J.S. was based on the plaintiffs’ allegations in that case that Backpage.com
creates content (the court accepted plaintiffs’ allegations that Backpage.com’s
rules to prevent improper content were meant to encourage such content). Again,
Plaintiffs here have waived this argument. It bears noting, as well, that J.S. has
been roundly criticized as inconsistent with the law interpreting Section 230 and as
a dangerous precedent for online free speech. See, e.g., Sophia Cope, Court Ruling
Against Backpage.com is a Setback for Online Speech in Washington State (Sep. 8,
2015), www.eff.org/ deeplinks/2015/09/ court-ruling-against-backpagecomsetback-online-speech-washington-state.
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circuit is that Section 230 does provide immunity to online providers, and it is not
only appropriate but consistent with Congress’s intent to enforce Section 230 on a
12(b)(6) motion. See Lycos, 478 F.3d at 415; Ricci, 781 F.3d at 28 (treating CDA
preemption as affirmative defense but affirming dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6)
because “‘the statute’s barrier to suit is evident from the face of the complaint’”)
(quoting Klayman, 753 F.3d at 1357 (same)); see n.5, supra (collecting cases
deeming Section 230 an “immunity” from suit).
d.

“Good Faith.” Plaintiffs assert that because Backpage.com in the

district court mentioned its monitoring and screening of ads and cooperation with
law enforcement, it thereby made an “implicit invocation of Section 230 (c)(2),”
and the court should have “permitted discovery to proceed on [the] issue” of
whether Backpage.com acted in good faith. App. Br. at 50. Again, Plaintiffs raise
this issue for the first time on appeal and give it “perfunctory treatment,” meaning
it too is waived. Abdallah v. Bain Capital LLC, 752 F.3d 114, 120-21 (1st Cir.
2014). Regardless, Backpage.com moved to dismiss under Section 230 (c)(1),
which does not require a showing of good faith. See Levitt v. Yelp! Inc., No. 101321-EMC 2011 WL 5079526, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 2011) (noting that “the
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text of the two subsections of § 230(c) indicates that (c)(1)’s immunity applies
regardless of whether the publisher acts in good faith”).13
III.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED PLAINTIFFS’
CLAIMS UNDER 18 U.S.C. § 1595 AND MASS. G.L. c. 265, § 50.
A.

The Section 230(e)(1) Exemption for Federal Criminal
Prosecutions Does Not Apply.

Plaintiffs insist their civil claim for damages under 18 U.S.C. § 1595 is
exempt from immunity because subsection 230(e)(1) contains an exception for
enforcement of federal criminal statutes. Consistent with every court that has
addressed this argument, the district court correctly held that subsection 230(e)(1)
exempts only federal criminal prosecutions and not derivative civil claims.14

13

Subsection (c)(1) gives immunity to online providers for claims arising from
publication of third-party content, while subsection (c)(2) provides a separate
immunity for claims arising from online providers’ removal or blocking of content.
By the express terms of the statute, good faith is only an issue under subsection
(c)(2). Indeed, courts have consistently enforced immunity under (c)(1)
notwithstanding plaintiffs’ allegations that websites acted in bad faith. See, e.g.,
Jones, 755 F.3d at 398.
Seeking to create an argument about “good faith” now, Plaintiffs rely on one
judge’s concurrence in J.S., in which he offered his own reading of Section 230,
asserting that subsection (c)(1) does not create immunity and the only proscription
in the statute is subsection (c)(2). App. Br. at 49-50 (citing and quoting from J.S.,
2015 WL 5164599, at *6 (Wiggins, J., concurring)). Notably, the concurrence
cites no case law supporting this view (there is none) and refers to the extensive
body of Section 230 case law only to say that “[t]he dissent is correct that … many
courts [have] appl[ied] an expansive interpretation of [Section 230].” J.S., 2015
WL 5164599, at *7.
14
Plaintiffs do not argue that subsection 230(e)(1) saves their claim under Mass.
G.L. c. 265 § 50, nor could they, as subsection 230(e)(3) preempts all state-law
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Entitled “No effect on criminal law,” subsection 230(e)(1) states:
Nothing in this section shall be construed to impair the enforcement of
section 223 or 231 of this title, chapter 71 (relating to obscenity) or
110 (relating to sexual exploitation of children) of Title 18, or any
other Federal criminal statute.
47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(1) (emphasis added). At least six federal courts in addition to
the court below have held that “the CDA exception for federal criminal statutes
applies to government prosecutions, not to civil private rights of action under
[statutes] with criminal aspects.” Obado v. Magedson, 2014 WL 3778261, *8
(D.N.J. July 31, 2014) (emphasis added), aff’d, 612 F. App’x 90 (3rd Cir. 2015);
M.A., 809 F. Supp. 2d at 1053 (dismissing civil claims against Backpage.com
based on 18 U.S.C. §§ 1595 and 2255); Hinton, 72 F. Supp. 3d at 691; Dart v.
Craigslist, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 961, 965 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (reference in civil
complaint to federal criminal statute does not elevate nuisance action to criminal
prosecution); Doe v. Bates, No. 5:05-CV-91-DF-CMC, 2006 WL 3813758 (E.D.
Tex. Dec. 27, 2006) (exception applies only to criminal prosecutions); Goddard,
2008 WL 5245490, at *5 n.5 (Google immune for civil claim seeking to hold it
liable for money laundering under 18 U.S.C. § 1957).15 By titling the exemption

civil or criminal claims. See, e.g., Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 2d 805, 825 (holding
Section 230 preempted Tennessee criminal statute).
15

Plaintiffs cite no cases holding otherwise, only dicta from Nieman v. Versuslaw,
Inc., No. 12-3104, 2012 WL 3201931, at *9 (C.D. Ill. Aug. 3, 2012), aff'd, 512 F.
App’x 635 (7th Cir. 2013), see App. Br. at 51, where the court held the plaintiff
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“No effect on criminal law” and applying it only to “enforcement” of “Federal
criminal statutes,” Congress clearly articulated a narrow exception for federal
prosecutions, one that cannot apply to the “Civil remedy” created by 18 U.S.C.
§ 1595. See M.A., 809 F. Supp. 2d at 1055 (emphasizing differences between
“criminal law” and “civil law”). “Of course, Plaintiffs are not prosecutors, they are
civil litigants seeking to recover money damages under § 1595 for a violation of a
criminal statute.” David v. Signal Int’l, LLC, No. CIV.A. 08-1220, 2012 WL
10759668, at *20 (E.D. La. Jan. 4, 2012) (noting that 18 USC § 1595 “is a
damages statute, not a statutory penalty provision that imposes a monetary sanction
once the plaintiff establishes that the defendant has engaged in certain conduct”).
Section 230 itself supports the district court’s conclusion that “criminal and
civil actions differ in kind” and “Section 230 exempts only criminal prosecutions.”
Add. 22. In subsection 230(b)(5), Congress declared its policy to permit “vigorous
enforcement of Federal criminal laws to deter and punish trafficking in obscenity,
stalking, and harassment by means of a computer.” 47 U.S.C. § 230 (b)(5).
Punishment is the province of criminal law,16 and as for deterrence, this Court held

failed to state a claim under RICO. Plaintiffs’ allusions to cases mentioning that
civil claims are included in other statutes (RICO and antitrust) to aid in their
enforcement has nothing to do with the express terms of subsection 230(e)(1) and
Congress’s intent as reflected in that law.
16
See Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (defining “criminal law” as “[t]he
body of law defining offenses against the community at large . . . and establishing
punishments for convicted offenders”).
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in Lycos that Congress made a “policy choice … not to deter harmful online
speech through the … route of imposing tort liability on companies that serve as
intermediaries for other parties’ potentially injurious messages.” Lycos, 478 F.3d
at 418 (emphasis added).
In addition, Plaintiffs’ interpretation would make part of Section 230
superfluous. Subsection (e)(4) provides that nothing in Section 230 “shall be
construed to limit the application of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of
1986” (“ECPA”). ECPA is a criminal statute that, like the TVPRA, provides for
civil claims. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511, 2520. If Plaintiffs’ interpretation of § 230(e)(1)
was correct, subsection 230(e)(4) would be surplusage, because both criminal and
civil ECPA claims would already be exempted under (e)(1). See United States v.
Commonwealth Energy Sys. & Subsidiary Companies, 235 F.3d 11, 15 (1st Cir.
2000) (statutes must be construed “so that each part is given effect and no part is
rendered inoperative or superfluous”).17
Finally, Congress recently reinforced the distinction between criminal and
civil liability in the TVPRA and reiterated that Section 230 immunizes online
providers from the latter. In Public Law 114-22, Congress amended 18 U.S.C.
17

Indeed, subsection 230(e)(4) exempts any “application” of ECPA, whether civil
or criminal, while the statute uses the narrower term “enforcement” in subsection
(e)(1). Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (“We refrain from
concluding here that the differing language in the two subsections has the same
meaning in each.”).
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§ 1591 to provide that a person who “advertises” a victim for sex trafficking may
be criminally liable.18 In so doing, Congress expressly stated that it was not
changing Section 230 immunity for derivative civil claims based on 18 U.S.C.
§ 1595—i.e., claims such as Plaintiffs assert here. The House Report for the bill
that became law stated:
H.R. 285 clarifies that people who advertise sex trafficking can face
criminal liability. … Under current law, Section 1595 of Title 18
extends the possibility of civil liability to defendants who violate
Section 1591. However, under Section 230 of the Communications
Decency Act, online publishers of third-party advertisements are
generally immune from civil liability for such advertisements. H.R.
285 does nothing to disrupt or modify the civil immunity already
provided by Section 230.
H.R. REP. NO. 114-8, at 3 (2015). If Congress believed that civil claims under
Section 1595 were exempt from Section 230, it certainly would not have said the
opposite.
B.

Plaintiffs’ Claims Under 18 U.S.C. § 1595 and the MATA Are Not
Plausible In Any Event.

Even if Plaintiffs could assert claims under 18 U.S.C. § 1595 and the MATA
notwithstanding Section 230, their allegations do not come close to plausibly
alleging such claims.

18

The amendment added “advertises” to the other predicate acts that may
constitute sex trafficking (e.g., “recruits, entices, harbors, transports, provides,
obtains, advertises, maintains”) with sufficient proof of mens rea and the other
elements of the statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 1591.
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To bring a civil claim under either 18 U.S.C. § 1595 or G.L. c. 265, § 51(d),
a plaintiff must allege and ultimately prove all the elements of the predicate
crimes. See Doe v. Liberatore, 478 F. Supp. 2d 742, 755 (M.D. Pa. 2007) (18
U.S.C. § 2255 requires showing defendant committed underlying crime). Thus, for
their Section 1595 civil claim, Plaintiffs must show Backpage.com (1) “knowingly
benefit[ed] financially” (2) “from participation in a venture” that (3) “engaged in
an act” of sex trafficking while (4) knowing or recklessly disregarding that the
trafficker would use force, fraud, or coercion or that the victim was underage. 18
U.S.C. § 1591(a)(2).
Plaintiffs allege no facts to support any of these elements. Their allegations
about Backpage.com’s business model are insufficient because criminal law
requires knowing participation to accomplish “‘a certain crime.’” Liberatore, 478
F. Supp. 2d at 756 (quoting United States v. Salmon, 944 F.2d 1106, 1113 (3d Cir.
1991) (emphasis in original)). Plaintiffs do not identify a specific sex trafficking
incident, much less allege Backpage.com participated in a venture to accomplish it.
At base, Plaintiffs misunderstand the anti-trafficking laws’ requirements for
mens rea and knowing “participation in a venture,” 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(2), or
acting as a “joint venturer in trafficking of [a] person,” G.L. c. 265, § 51. The
courts have held that participating in a venture under 18 U.S.C. § 1591 means
aiding and abetting, requiring proof the defendant “was associated with a criminal
36
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venture, participated in it as something he wished to bring about and sought [by]
his actions to make it succeed.” United States v. Afyare, 2013 WL 2643408, at *12
(M.D. Tenn. June 12, 2013) (quoting United States v. Longoria, 569 F.2d 422, 425
(5th Cir. 1978)).19 In other words, the defendant must share “in the criminal intent
of the principal” and “commit[] an overt act designed to aid in the success of the
venture.” Id. (quoting Longoria, 569 F.2d at 425).20 Thus, the U.S. Department of
Justice and courts have agreed that websites cannot be criminally liable for
publishing third-party content, unless the site knew of, participated in, and sought
to bring about a specific crime. The DOJ’s National Coordinator for Child
Exploitation Prevention and Interdiction testified to Congress that an “Internet
provider[] like craigslist” is not “criminally liable for [third-party] postings unless”
19

See also La. Mun. Police Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Hershey Co., No. 7996-ML, 2013
WL 6120439, at *7, 9 (Del. Ch. Nov. 8, 2013) (allegations about Hershey’s
knowledge of illegal trafficking in African cocoa farming provided no plausible
basis to claim Hershey participated in a venture to exploit child labor); Stein v.
World-Wide Plumbing Supply Inc., No. 13 Civ. 6795 (BMC), 2014 WL 6783739,
at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 2014) (dismissing Section 1595 claim where complaint
provided no factual allegations defendants knew of peonage scheme); United
States v. Polanco, 634 F.3d 39, 44 (1st Cir. 2011) (noting “Judge Learned Hand’s
‘classic’ definition that an aider and abettor is one who associate[s] himself with
the venture, … participate[s] in it as in something that he wishes to bring about,’
and ‘seek[s] by his action to make it succeed” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
20
G.L. c. 265, § 51(d), also refers to aiding and abetting requirements—it permits
liability against a business entity only if it “knowingly aids or is a joint venturer in
trafficking.” See Commonwealth v. Zanetti, 454 Mass. 449, 467 (2009) (“[J]oint
venture criminal liability has two essential elements: that the defendant knowingly
participated in the commission of the crime charged, and that the defendant had or
shared the required criminal intent.”).
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it “was a participant . . . conspiring with those who were misusing the site,”
because “the standard for prosecution would be knowing or willful [conduct].”
Domestic Minor Sex Trafficking: Hearing before Senate Subcomm. on Crime,
Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong.
215-16 (2010). She also explained: “We have [the proper tools] to prosecute the
guilty, that is, the people who are using the Internet” and cautioned against a
different rule because no one “would propose closing the Internet.” Id. at 216.
Courts, too, have rejected claims based on allegations that websites assist, promote,
or aid and abet users’ criminal conduct.21
Nothing in the Complaint remotely suggests Backpage.com participated in
any venture with Plaintiffs’ pimps to traffic them, shared any criminal intent, knew
the ads when posted were for sex trafficking or the persons depicted were underage
or coerced, or took any overt act to accomplish the pimps’ unlawful aims. Plaintiffs
have therefore provided no plausible allegations to support any element of the antitrafficking laws on which they base their civil claims.

21

See, e.g., Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 659 (7th Cir. 2003) (website did “not
satisfy the ordinary understanding of culpable assistance to a wrongdoer, which
requires a desire to promote the wrongful venture’s success”); Dart, 665 F. Supp.
2d 961, 967-69 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (Craigslist not culpable for “aiding and abetting”
users as it did not “cause” them to do anything except “in the sense that no one
could post [unlawful content] if craigslist did not offer a forum”); M.A., 809 F.
Supp. 2d at 1054 (rejecting claims against Backpage.com under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1595
and 2255 because plaintiff’s general allegations about website “do not describe the
specific intent required” for criminal liability).
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THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED PLAINTIFFS’
CHAPTER 93A CLAIMS.
The district court correctly dismissed Plaintiffs’ c. 93A claims because they

are barred by Section 230 and fail to allege any plausible grounds for relief.
Courts have widely held Section 230 immunity encompasses claims under
state consumer protection statutes. See, e.g., Hinton, 72 F. Supp. 3d 685
(Mississippi Consumer Protection Act); Obado, 2014 WL 3778261, at *1 (New
Jersey Consumer Fraud Act); Goddard, 2008 WL 5245490, at *1 (California Unfair
Competition Law); Sexsearch.com, 502 F. Supp. 2d at 723, 728 (Ohio Consumer
Sales Practices Act); Roca Labs, Inc. v. Consumer Opinion Corp., 2015 WL
6437786, at *10 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 21, 2015) (Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade
Practices Act). Where Section 230 applies, “providers are immune from ‘any’
claim arising out of content originating from a third party, regardless of the theory
of the underlying cause of action.” Obado, 2014 WL 3778261, at *4.
Plaintiffs’ theory is that their c. 93A claims are somehow divorced from the
ads on Backpage.com. They contend their c. 93A claims “center on Backpage’s
deceptive representations, conduct that is wholly separate from Backpage’s
publication” of ads, App. Br. at 44, or, as they put it in the district court, the claims
should survive “even if the ad[s] had never been posted,” Dkt. No. 25, at 16.
Contradicting Plaintiffs’ assertions, the district court accurately observed that
“[w]ithout the offending ads, no nexus would exist between Backpage and the
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harms suffered by the Doe plaintiffs.” Add. 25. As noted, Plaintiffs’ Complaint
alleges they suffered harm “as a result” of the ads posted about them, App. 50, ¶ 89;
App. 51, ¶ 94, not because they heard or relied on any representations made by
Backpage.com. Plaintiffs do not have standing to sue Backpage.com as private
attorneys general or self-appointed censors of the Internet. Indeed, allowing such a
claim would be an egregious form of the “heckler’s veto,” which the First
Amendment and Section 230 forbid. See Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521
U.S. 844, 880 (1997); Jones, 755 F.3d at 407.22
Even if Section 230 was not a complete bar to Plaintiffs’ c. 93A claims (and it
is), the claims fail because they are far too speculative to be plausible, as the district
court held. Add. 25. Under c. 93A, Plaintiffs must show that they were “injured
by” the “use or employment” of “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct

22

Plaintiffs rely on two district court decisions that are readily distinguishable, see
App. Br. at 43-44, as both allowed c. 93A claims based on online content created
or developed by websites rather than third parties. In Small Justice, LLC v.
Xcentric Ventures LLC, No. 13-cv-11701, 2014 WL 1214828 (D. Mass. Mar. 24,
2014), the court held that a lawyer’s claims against a website (Ripoffreport.com)
for refusing to take down negative reviews about him were barred by Section 230,
noting that plaintiffs “cannot attempt an end run around the CDA through the use
of c. 93A.” Id. at *8. The court declined to dismiss a separate claim in which the
lawyer challenged a program offered and promoted by the website ostensibly to
“restore” businesses’ reputations for a fee. Similarly, in Moving & Storage, Inc. v.
Panayotov, No. 12-12262-GAO, 2014 WL 949830 (D. Mass. Mar. 12, 2014), the
court refused to dismiss claims against a moving company based on
representations it made on its website that customer reviews were objective, when
the plaintiff (a competing moving company) alleged that, contrary to those
representations, the website omitted all favorable reviews about competitors.
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of any trade or commerce.” G.L. c. 93A, §§ 2, 9. “[A] plaintiff must demonstrate
that she suffered a separate, identifiable harm arising from the violation itself that
bears a causal connection to the unfair or deceptive act.” Ferreira v. Sterling
Jewelers, Inc., No. 13-13165-DPW, 2015 WL 5437086, at *3 (D. Mass. Sept. 15,
2015) (emphasis added); see Tyler v. Michaels Stores, Inc., 464 Mass. 492, 503,
984 N.E.2d 737, 745 (2013) (requiring a “distinct injury or harm that arises from
the claimed unfair or deceptive act itself”). Put differently, “a causal connection
between a deceptive act and a loss to the consumer is an essential predicate for
recovery.” Hershenow v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. of Boston, 445 Mass. 790,
791, 840 N.E.2d 526, 528 (2006); see also RSA Media, Inc. v. AK Media Group,
Inc., 260 F.3d 10, 16 (1st Cir. 2001) (“causation remains a necessary element of a
successful 93A claim”); A.G. ex rel. Maddox v. Elsevier, Inc., 732 F.3d 77, 81 (1st
Cir. 2013) (upholding dismissal of c. 93A claim where “the allegation of causation
[was] unembellished by any supporting facts”).
Plaintiffs’ theory for their c. 93A claims is based on a number of speculative
allegations, one piled atop another. They contend that (a) because Backpage.com
has worked with and made representations to law enforcement and groups such as
NCMEC to combat sex trafficking—actions that Plaintiffs allege are a ruse; (b)
this “successfully deflected public scrutiny”; (c) thereby “lowering the supply-side
transaction costs involved in sex trafficking online,” which (d) allowed the “online
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sex market” to grow; and (e) this “expanded market ensnared the Plaintiffs”;
(f) whereas, otherwise, the website might have been shut down altogether; and
(g) Plaintiffs would have never been victimized by the pimps who recruited and
abused them. See App. Br. at 55-57.23 This “hypothesized chain of events falls
far short of chapter 93A’s causation requirement.” Ray v. Ropes & Gray LLP, 961
F. Supp. 2d 344, 361 (D. Mass. 2013); see also Hershenow, 445 Mass. at 802, 804,
840 N.E.2d at 536, 537 (when impact on plaintiff of alleged unfair or deceptive act
is “speculative and uncertain,” the required “causal connection” is absent); Smith v.
Jenkins, 732 F.3d 51, 71-72 (1st Cir. 2013) (vacating c. 93A judgment where
plaintiff’s claim was based on speculation without evidence). As the district court
correctly held, Plaintiffs’ supposed chain of causation does not “fall … within the
penumbra of reasonabl[e] foreseeability,” “as a matter of law.” Add. 25.24
23

Plaintiffs’ Complaint asserts similar attenuated causation, i.e., that
Backpage.com has “avoided, minimized and delayed the intense publicly [sic]
media, legislative, and law enforcement scrutiny that reasonably could have been
expected to interfere with, if not terminate, its efforts to grow market share,” and,
as a result, Plaintiffs were “sold for sex, trafficked [and] raped ….” App. 58,
¶ 126.
24

Not only do Plaintiffs fail to support their c. 93A claim with a plausible theory of
causation, they do not even identify the alleged misrepresentations on which the
claims purportedly are based. Plaintiffs merely assert that there were “numerous”
undescribed “interactions” between Backpage.com and unidentified “state and
federal law enforcement agencies beginning in or about 2010,” in which
Backpage.com allegedly provided “assurances” that it would use “various means”
to detect trafficking. App. 25, ¶ 32. These hazy allegations fail to satisfy Fed. R.
Civ. P. 8, much less comply with Rule 9(b)’s requirement of pleading with
particularity. Santos v. SANYO Mfg. Corp., No. CIV.A. 12-11452-RGS, 2013 WL
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Plaintiffs urge the Court to rely on “‘[c]ommon economic sense’ to test the
plausibility of causation pleadings … where market forces are the media of injury.”
App. Br. at 56. Whatever that might mean, the cases they cite concern competitor
standing, i.e., claims by a business that it was injured by unfair trade practices of a
competitor. See Katin v. Nat’l Real Estate Info. Servs., Inc., No. 07-10882-DPW,
2009 WL 929554, at *5-7, *10 (D. Mass. Mar. 31, 2009) (lawyers who sued real
estate settlement service providers for unauthorized practice of law sufficiently
alleged lost business under competitor standing doctrine); Boston Cab Dispatch,
Inc. v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 13-10769-NMG, 2015 WL 314131, at *4 (D. Mass.
Jan. 26, 2015) (unfair competition claim by taxi companies against Uber). Such
claims have nothing to do with this case, for the simple reason that Plaintiffs do not
allege they were competitors of Backpage.com. 25
Nor have Plaintiffs alleged that they were misled or injured as consumers in
a transaction with the website, which is a necessary predicate for c. 93A claims
that are not between competitors. The statute “‘is intended to protect against unfair
and deceptive practices in trade, not unfair practices in general.’” Swenson v.
1868268, at *6 (D. Mass. May 3, 2013) (“Where a Chapter 93A action sounds in
fraud, a plaintiff must plead such fraud with particularity.”).
25
Plaintiffs also advert to Mullins v. Pine Manor College, 389 Mass. 47 (1983),
which is not a case concerning c. 93A, but held that a college was liable for failing
to prevent the rape of a student where the risks of such attacks were foreseeable
and the college owed a “distinctive relationship” to protect students. 389 Mass. at
56. Obviously, a website has no such relationship with third-party users.
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Yellow Transp., Inc., 317 F. Supp. 2d 51, 56-57 (D. Mass. 2004) (dismissing c.
93A claim arising from auto accident, where plaintiffs contended the defendant
trucking company’s policies encouraged speeding (quoting L.B. Corp. v.
Schweitzer-Mauduit Int’l, Inc., 121 F. Supp. 2d 147, 152 (D. Mass. 2000))).26
V.

PLAINTIFFS’ STATE-LAW RIGHT-OF-PUBLICITY CLAIMS ARE
BARRED BY SECTION 230, AND ALSO FAIL TO STATE A CLAIM.
Plaintiffs also sought damages for the “unauthorized use of pictures of a

person” under Massachusetts law, G.L. c. 214, § 3A, and, in the case of Doe 1, the
Rhode Island privacy statute, R.I. St. § 9-1-28. These claims also fall within
Section 230 immunity and are not viable in any event.
A right-of-publicity claim is not an “intellectual property claim” as the
phrase is used in Section 230(e)(2). “Intellectual property” is a “category of
intangible rights protecting commercially valuable products of the human
intellect.” Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). As the court below properly
observed, “a person’s image is not a ‘product of the human intellect.’” Add. 29
n.13. Rather, the right of publicity “flows from the right to privacy,” Alvarez

26

In L.B. Corp., the court explained that “[a]part from claims of unfair
competition, a plaintiff must allege some sort of transaction between the parties for
liability to attach …. This is the ‘common thread’ of 93A cases. Plaintiff’s
position, if accepted, would run the danger of converting any tort claim against a
business into a Chapter 93A claim, because all torts encompass ‘acts or practices’
that could arguably be considered ‘unfair.’ [T]his position tests the limits of
common sense.” Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
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Guedes v. Marcano Martinez, 131 F. Supp. 2d 272, 278 (D.P.R. 2001); see also
Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 78 (Ga. 1905) (noting that right
of publicity is one of the four privacy torts, protecting “the right of the individual
to be let alone”). Courts have routinely relied on CDA immunity to dismiss other
invasion-of-privacy claims. See, e.g., Dowbenko v. Google Inc., 991 F. Supp. 2d
1219, 1220 (S.D. Fla. 2013); Gavra v. Google Inc., No. 5:12-CV-06547-PSG,
2013 WL 3788241 (N.D. Cal. July 17, 2013).27
Even putting aside Section 230 immunity, Plaintiffs cannot assert a claim
under G.L. c. 214, § 3A, because they do not allege (and cannot allege) that
Backpage.com appropriated their likenesses and used them for its own commercial
benefit. The Massachusetts right of publicity statute protects “the interest in not
having the commercial value of one’s name, portrait or picture appropriated to the
benefit of another.” Tropeano v. Atl. Monthly Co., 379 Mass. 745, 749, 400
N.E.2d 847, 850 (1980). As the Supreme Judicial Court has held: “‘It is only
when the publicity is given for the purpose of appropriating to the defendant’s

27

Even if the right of publicity was deemed an “intellectual property” claim, the
CDA’s intellectual property exception, properly construed, applies only to federallaw intellectual property claims. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d
1102, 1118-19 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting the wide variety of state-law claims that
could come under the rubric of “intellectual property,” thereby sowing confusion
as to the scope of the exemption). But see Doe v. Friendfinder Network, Inc., 540
F. Supp. 2d 288 (D.N.H. 2008) (relying on dicta from Lycos, 478 F.3d 413, in
which the Court affirmed dismissal of a state-law trademark dilution claim on
other grounds).
45

Case: 15-1724

Document: 00116911434

Page: 60

Date Filed: 11/02/2015

Entry ID: 5950178

benefit the commercial or other values associated with the name or likeness’ that
this cause of action can exist.” Id. (quoting Nelson v. Maine Times, 373 A.2d 1221
(Me. 1977)) (emphasis added). “‘The fact that the defendant is engaged in the
business of publication, for example of a newspaper, out of which he makes or
seeks to make a profit, is not enough to make the incidental publication a
commercial use of the name or likeness.’” Id. (quoting Nelson, 373 A.2d at 1224);
see also Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 652C, comment d.
Here, Plaintiffs’ right of publicity count is based solely on the premise that
ads posted on Backpage.com by the pimps (or at their direction) “displayed
photographs” of the Plaintiffs. App. 60, ¶ 133. The Complaint contains no
plausible allegations that Backpage.com used plaintiffs’ images for its own benefit.
Tropeano, 379 Mass. at 749, 400 N.E.2d at 850. A publisher is not liable for
commercial misappropriation merely because a third-party advertisement appeared
in its publication. Cabaniss v. Hipsley, 114 Ga. App. 367, 381-82 (1966)
(dismissing right of publicity claim against magazine publisher because
appropriation of plaintiff’s photograph inured to the benefit of advertiser, not the
magazine itself); see also Almeida v. Amazon.com, Inc., 456 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir.
2006) (no violation of right of publicity by Amazon’s display of book bearing
plaintiff’s photograph on cover); Gauck v. Karamian, 805 F. Supp. 2d 495, 502-03
(W.D. Tenn. 2011) (rejecting right of publicity claim where website published
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third-party posts containing plaintiff’s photograph but did not use photo to
advertise the website).
Plaintiffs cannot save their claim by arguing that Backpage.com’s use of
photographs was “an integral part of [Backpage’s] business model” to “encourage,
support, and materially contribute to the use by pimps and traffickers … of
photographic images to enhance the effectiveness” of the pimps’ ads. App. 59,
¶ 130 (emphasis added). The allegation that photographs generally are an “integral
part” of Backpage.com’s “business model” is not the same as to say that the
Plaintiffs’ individual photos were used by Backpage.com “for purposes of
publicity” or to appropriate the commercial or other values associated with
plaintiffs to Backpage’s benefit.28 They were not. Plaintiffs have cited no case
holding that a website, newspaper, or other media entity can be held liable for
commercial misappropriation merely for “support[ing]” or “encourag[ing]” third
parties to “place[]” advertisements containing pictures.
Doe 1’s claim based on R.I. St. § 9-1-28 fails for the same reasons. Like the
Massachusetts statute, section 28 applies only when a defendant appropriates a
person’s name or likeness “for commercial purposes,” meaning for the defendant’s
own “advertising purposes.” Mendonsa v. Time Inc., 678 F. Supp. 967, 970 (D.R.I.
1988); see also Herink v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 607 F. Supp. 657, 659
28

There is no allegation that Backpage.com charges more for ads with photos than
for ads without; it does not.
47

Case: 15-1724

Document: 00116911434

Page: 62

Date Filed: 11/02/2015

Entry ID: 5950178

(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (under New York statute, on which § 9-1-28 was based, “[t]he
advertising purposes prong … is not violated where the use of a plaintiff's name is
not designed primarily to solicit purchasers for defendant’s products” (emphasis
added)). Again, Backpage.com did not use Doe 1’s photo to advertise
Backpage.com (or for any purpose).
VI.

THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED DOE 3’S
COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT CLAIM.
Finally, Doe 3 asserts that Backpage.com should be held liable for copyright

infringement because her traffickers included a photograph she took of herself in
an advertisement that they uploaded to Backpage.com. App. 61, ¶ 142 (“Jane Doe
No. 3 provided certain photographs that she took of herself … which the traffickers
then included in the Backpage.com advertisements”). Any such claim lies against
Doe 3’s traffickers, not against Backpage.com.
The district court properly dismissed Doe 3’s copyright claim for failure to
plead any redressable damages. Add. 32-33. Doe 3 did not register the copyright
in her photograph until December 18, 2014, after the alleged infringement
occurred. Add. 31; App. 61, ¶ 142 & 64, Ex. A. As a result, she is not entitled to
the remedies of statutory damages or attorneys’ fees. 17 U.S.C. § 412. Rather, she
is limited to “the actual damages suffered by … her as a result of the infringement,
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and any profits of the infringer that are attributable to the infringement and are not
taken into account in computing the actual damages.” 17 U.S.C. § 504.
As to actual damages suffered, Doe 3 makes no allegation that she suffered a
financial loss, in the form of licensing revenue or otherwise, as a result of the
infringement. Accordingly, she cannot recover. See Dash v. Mayweather, 731
F.3d 303, 313 (4th Cir. 2013) (“a copyright holder asserting [actual] damages
‘must prove the existence of a causal connection between the alleged infringement
and some loss of anticipated revenue’”) (quoting Thoroughbred Software Int’l, Inc.
v. Dice Corp., 488 F.3d 352, 358 (6th Cir. 2007)).
As to Defendants’ profits attributable to the infringement, Doe 3 makes only
the general allegation that “[t]he Backpage Defendants derive a financial benefit
directly attributable to the public display of such photographs by virtue of the
payment of fees … to Backpage.com.” App. 60-61, ¶ 139; Add. 32. The
allegation that the inclusion of photographs on the website generally enhances the
financial value of the site does not come close to demonstrating that the inclusion
of one specific photo on the website—Doe’s “selfie”—can be causally linked to
any actual profits received in the operation of Backpage.com’s business. Such
profits are too speculative to allow for a recovery, see Goldenberg v. Doe, 731 F.
Supp. 1155, 1159-60 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) (denying recovery for pirated videotape
because actual damages were “speculative” and “tenuous”), and Plaintiffs cannot
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overcome the 12(b)(6) threshold based on mere speculation, Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555.29 See, e.g., Davis v. The Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 159 (2d Cir. 2001)
(affirming summary judgment because plaintiff was required to allege a “causal
connection between the infringement and the defendant’s profits,” and “the overall
revenues of The Gap Inc. had no reasonable relationship” to allegedly infringing
use of plaintiff’s eyeglass design in ad); see also Dash, 731 F.3d at 333 (affirming
summary judgment dismissing all claims for actual damages and profits for failure
of proof). Put simply, the threadbare and conclusory damages allegations of the
Complaint are not enough to “nudge [Doe 3’s] claims across the line from
conceivable to plausible.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
In their appellate brief, Plaintiffs protest that the district court overlooked the
general prayer for injunctive relief tucked into the conclusion of their Complaint.
App. 62. However, a plaintiff is not automatically entitled to injunctive relief on
the finding of a copyright violation. Nimmer on Copyright (Dec. 2014)
§ 14.06[B][1][a] (“injunctive relief ordinarily is not granted absent any threat of
continuing or additional infringements” (citing Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Arlos, 682

The doctrine of “de minimis non curat lex” also cautions against allowing such
minor and speculative claims to proceed. Hessel v. O'Hearn, 977 F.2d 299, 303
(7th Cir. 1992) (a case must be dismissed under the de minimis doctrine, in order to
prevent devoting “substantial resources” to “determining whether there was any
loss at all”). The doctrine has been applied in the copyright context. See, e.g.,
Knickerbocker Toy Co., Inc. v. Azrak-Hamway Int’l, Inc., 668 F.2d 699, 703 (2d
Cir. 1982).
29
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F. Supp. 1, 3 (D. Mass. 1986))); Nimmer, § 14.06[B][1][b][i] (“injunction is not the
automatic consequence of infringement” (quoting New Era Publications Int’l, ApS
v. Henry Holt & Co., 884 F.2d 659, 661 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1094
(1990))). Rather, the plaintiff must have alleged that continued infringement is
likely to occur. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 659 F.2d
963, 976 (9th Cir.1981), rev'd on other grounds, 464 U.S. 417 (1984). Doe 3 has
not alleged that her photo continues to be displayed on the Backpage.com site, and
there is no reasonable basis for apprehension that it will appear there in the future.
“A single past instance of exposure to illegal conduct is insufficient to establish
standing for injunctive relief if there are no ‘continuing, present adverse effects.’”
Newdow v. Eagen, 309 F. Supp. 2d 29 (D.D.C. 2004) (quoting O'Shea v. Littleton,
414 U.S. 488, 495-96 (1974)).
In addition to inadequately alleging redressable damages, the Complaint
fails plausibly to plead liability under any of the three available copyright
infringement theories: direct infringement, contributory infringement, or vicarious
infringement.30 Doe 3 has not stated a claim for direct copyright infringement
because she admits that third parties—not Backpage.com—uploaded her
photograph to Backpage.com. App. 61, ¶ 142. “[A] person [must] engage in

30

This Court is “not limited by the district court’s reasoning, and … ‘may affirm
an order of dismissal on any basis made apparent by the record.’” Lycos, 478 F.3d
at 418 (quoting McCloskey v. Mueller, 446 F.3d 262, 266 (1st Cir. 2006)).
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volitional conduct—specifically, the act constituting infringement—to become a
direct infringer.” CoStar Group, Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 549 (4th Cir.
2004) (citing Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Communication
Services, Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal.1995)) (website hosting online real
estate listings for brokers not liable for direct infringement by users who uploaded
infringing photos); Holy Transfig. Monastery, Inc. v. Gregory, 689 F.3d 29, 39 (1st
Cir. 2012) (“copying of constituent elements of the work that are original” is
element of direct infringement claim). Where a plaintiff fails to show that an
online provider itself “uploaded or downloaded the files, or directly caused such
uploading or downloading to occur,” it is not liable for direct infringement. Sega
Enterprises, Ltd. v. MAPHIA, 948 F. Supp. 923, 932 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (no direct
infringement where proprietor of online bulletin board system knew infringing
activity was occurring and solicited others to upload infringing content).31

31

See also ALS Scan, Inc. v. RemarQ Communities, Inc., 239 F.3d 619, 622 (4th
Cir. 2001) (ISP facilitating access to newsgroups not liable for direct infringement
by users who uploaded infringing images); Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC
Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 133 (2d Cir. 2008) (cable television company not
liable for direct infringement by allowing customers to make copies of programs
using its digital video recorder); Sarvis v. Polyvore, Inc., No. 12-12233-NMG,
2013 WL 4056208, at *8 (D. Mass. Aug. 9, 2013) (recommending dismissal of
direct infringement claim on ground that plaintiff failed plausibly to allege
volitional copying, where artworks were posted to defendant’s website); Williams
v. Scribd, Inc., No. 09cv1836-LAB, 2010 WL 10090006 (S.D. Cal. June 23, 2010)
(granting motion to dismiss direct infringement claim premised on user’s
uploading of book excerpts to website); Parker v. Google, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d
492, 497 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (holding on motion to dismiss: “It is clear that Google's
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Relying on Holy Transfig. Monastery, Inc., 689 F.3d at 39, Doe 3 contended
below that Backpage.com can be held liable for direct infringement because it
performed “supervisory acts” which ensured that her photograph was “available on
a server and posted to a website.” Dkt No. 25, at 28. But in that case, the poster of
the copyrighted material was an agent of the defendant, and the court’s ruling was
based on agency principles. Id. at 56. Plaintiffs do not allege that “the traffickers”
who “included” Doe 3’s photographs “in the Backpage.com advertisements” did so
as agents of Backpage.com. App. 61, ¶ 142. Nor do they make any other
allegations to satisfy the required element of volitional “copying” of Doe 3’s
photograph.
As for vicarious liability, Doe 3 makes the conclusory allegation that
Backpage.com has the “right and ability to supervise the infringing activity” and “a
direct financial interest” in it. See, e.g., App. 60-61, ¶¶ 139, 140; App. 62, ¶ 146.
Yet, to survive a motion to dismiss, she must allege facts to support both
assertions, and the Complaint is bereft of them. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Intern.
Service Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788, 803 (9th Cir. 2007) (affirming dismissal of vicarious
liability claim against credit card companies for processing payments for infringing
images on websites); Hendrickson v. eBay, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1093-1094
automatic archiving of USENET postings and excerpting of websites in its results
to users’ search queries do not include the necessary volitional element to
constitute direct copyright infringement”).
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(C.D. Cal. 2001) (ability to remove or block access to materials posted on website
or voluntary monitoring of website for infringement does not mean website has
right and ability to supervise infringing conduct); Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v.
Fung, 710 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2013) (“direct financial benefit” requires
defendant’s revenue be tied “directly to the infringing activity involving [its]
websites”).
The claim for contributory infringement fares no better, because Doe 3 again
offers no more than a conclusory statement that Backpage.com knew the photo was
infringing or that it materially contributed to the infringement. App. 60-61, ¶ 139;
62, ¶ 145; see Luvdarts, LLC v. AT & T Mobility, LLC, 710 F.3d 1068 (9th Cir.
2013) (affirming dismissal where plaintiff alleged wireless carriers did nothing to
stop users from re-sharing content; “conclusory allegations that the Carriers had
the required knowledge of infringement are plainly insufficient”). The law
requires “knowledge of specific and identifiable infringements,” i.e., “actual
knowledge that the material is infringing.” Viacom Intern., Inc. v. YouTube, Inc.,
676 F.3d 19, 20 (2d Cir. 2011); see also UMG Recordings v. Shelter Capital
Partners, 718 F.3d 1006, 1022 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Merely hosting a category of
copyrightable content…with the general knowledge that one’s services could be
used to share infringing material, is insufficient to meet the actual knowledge
requirement[.]”). The Complaint does not allege that anyone notified
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Backpage.com, or that the web site had any other source of knowledge, that the
posting constituted copyright infringement. See App. 54, ¶ 105 (alleging Doe 3’s
parents requested removal of ad for other reasons).
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the District Court’s Order and Judgment of May
15, 2015, should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
BACKPAGE.COM, LLC, CAMARILLO
HOLDINGS, LLC, f/k/a Village Voice
Media Holdings, LLC, and NEW TIMES
MEDIA, LLC
By their attorneys,
/s/ Robert A. Bertsche
Robert A. Bertsche, 1st Cir. No. 16637
rbertsche@PrinceLobel.com
Jeffrey J. Pyle, 1st Cir. No. 100940
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1201 Third Ave., Suite 2200
Seattle, WA 98101
Tel.: 206-757-8096
Fax: 206-757-7096
Dated: November 2, 2015

56

Case: 15-1724

Document: 00116911434

Page: 71

Date Filed: 11/02/2015

Entry ID: 5950178

Certificate of Compliance With Rule 32(a)
1. This brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Fed. R. App. P.
32(a)(7)(B) because this brief contains 13,929 words, excluding the parts
of the brief exempted by Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(B)(iii).
2. This brief complies with the typeface requirements of Fed. R. App. P.
32(a)(5) and the type style requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(6)
because this brief has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface
using Microsoft Word version 14.0.7 in 14-point Times New Roman
font.
/s/ Robert A. Bertsche
Robert A. Bertsche
Attorney for Defendants/Appellees
Dated: November 2, 2015

57

Case: 15-1724

Document: 00116911434

Page: 72

Date Filed: 11/02/2015

Entry ID: 5950178

Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that on November 2, 2015, I electronically filed the
foregoing document with the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
by using the CM/ECF system. I certify that the following parties and counsel of
record to the parties and prospective amici are registered as ECF Filers and that
they will be served by the CM/ECF system:
John T. Montgomery
Rebecca C. Ellis
Ching-Lee Fukuda
Aaron M. Katz
Dara Ann Reppucci
Christine Ezzell Singer
Jessica Lucia Soto
ROPES & GRAY LLP
800 Boylston St.
Boston, MA 02199-3600

Genevieve C. Nadeau
MASSACHUSETTS ATTORNEY
GENERAL’S OFFICE
One Ashburton Place
Boston, MA 02108-0000
Jenna A. Hudson
Kami E. Quinn
GILBERT LLP
1100 New York Avenue
Suite 700
Washington, DC 20005

Stacey J. Rappaport
MILBANK TWEED HADLEY
& McCLOY LLP
1 Chase Manhattan Plaza
New York, NY 10005-0000

Andrea Powell
2100 M Street NW
Washington, DC 20037-1233

Mark David Lipton
OFFICE OF THE CITY ATTORNEY
1390 Market St., 6th floor
San Francisco, CA 94102

Dennis J. Herrera
Elizabeth Pederson
Victoria Wong
City Hall, Room 234
1 Dr. Carlton B. Goodlett Place
San Francisco, CA 94102-4682

Robert Barnes
Oscar Ramallo
Michael A. Rogoff
KAYE SCHOLER LLP
1999 Avenue of the Stars
Suite 1600
Los Angeles, CA 90067

Jeffrey T. Dana
RI LEGAL SERVICES
56 Pine St., Ste. 400
Providence, RI 02903-0000

58

Case: 15-1724

Document: 00116911434

Page: 73

Harry Auerbach
Tracy Reeve
430 City Hall
1221 SW Fourth Ave.
Portland, OR 97204

Date Filed: 11/02/2015

Entry ID: 5950178

Donna Edmundson
HOUSTON CITY ATTORNEY
900 Bagby Street, 4th floor
Houston, TX 77002
Cathy Hampton
CITY OF ATLANTA LAW
DEPARTMENT
55 Trinity Avenue, SW
Suite 5000
Atlanta, GA 30303

James P. Clark
Michael N. Feuer
Mary Claire Molidor
Sahar Nayeri
Anh Truong
200 North Main Street
Room 966
Los Angeles, CA 90012
Shelley R. Smith
CITY OF PHILADELPHIA
LAW DEPARTMENT
1515 Arch Street
Philadelphia, PA 19102

/s/ Robert A. Bertsche
Robert A. Bertsche

59

Case: 15-1724

Document: 00116911434

Page: 74

Date Filed: 11/02/2015

Entry ID: 5950178

NO. 15-1724
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

JANE DOE NO. 1, JANE DOE NO. 2, JANE DOE NO. 3,
SAM LOE, and SARA LOE,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
BACKPAGE.COM, LLC,
CAMARILLO HOLDINGS, LLC f/k/a Village Voice Media Holding, LLC,
and NEW TIMES MEDIA, LLC,
Defendants-Appellees

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

ADDENDUM TO APPELLEES’ BRIEF
REQUIRED BY FIRST CIRCUIT LOCAL RULE 28.0
__________________________________________________________________
James C. Grant, 1st Cir. No. 1170894
jimgrant@dwt.com
Ambika K. Doran, 1st Cir. No. 1170935
ambikadoran@dwt.com
DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP
1201 Third Ave., Suite 2200
Seattle, WA 98101
Tel.: 206-757-8096
Fax: 206-757-7096

Robert A. Bertsche, 1st Cir. No. 16637
rbertsche@PrinceLobel.com
Jeffrey J. Pyle, 1st Cir. No. 100940
jpyle@PrinceLobel.com
PRINCE LOBEL TYE LLP
100 Cambridge Street, Suite 2200
Boston, MA 02114
Tel.: 617-456-8000
Fax: 617-456-8100

Dated: November 2, 2015
i

Case: 15-1724

Document: 00116911434

Page: 75

Date Filed: 11/02/2015

Entry ID: 5950178

APPELLEES’ ADDENDUM
Table of Contents

District Court Order and Memorandum (D. Mass. May 15, 2015) ...................Add.1
District Court Judgment (D. Mass. May 15, 2015) ........................................Add. 35
47 U.S.C. § 230 ...............................................................................................Add. 36
18 U.S.C. § 1591 (as of Dec. 29, 2014) ..........................................................Add. 40
18 U.S.C. § 1595 (as of Dec. 29, 2014) ..........................................................Add. 42
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, § 50 .......................................................................Add. 43
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, §§ 2, 9 ..................................................................Add. 45
17 U.S.C. §§ 501, 502, 504, 505 .....................................................................Add. 49
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 214, § 3A ......................................................................Add. 55
R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-28..................................................................................Add. 56
R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-28.1...............................................................................Add. 57

ii

Case: 15-1724 Case
Document:
1:14-cv-13870-RGS
00116911434 Document
Page: 7653 Filed
Date 05/15/15
Filed: 11/02/2015
Page 1 of 34
Entry ID: 5950178

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
CIVIL ACTION NO. 14-13870-RGS
JANE DOE NO. 1, a minor child,
by her parent and next friend MARY ROE;
JANE DOE NO. 2;
and JANE DOE NO. 3, a minor child,
by her parents and next friends SAM LOE AND SARA LOE
v.
BACKPAGE.COM, LLC, CAMARILLO HOLDINGS, LLC
(f/k/a VILLAGE VOICE MEDIA HOLDINGS, LLC),
and NEW TIMES MEDIA, LLC
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS
May 15, 2015
STEARNS, D.J.
In this litigation, two important public policies collide head on – the
suppression of child sex trafficking and the promotion of a free and open
Internet. Plaintiffs Jane Doe No. 1, Jane Doe No. 2, and Jane Doe No. 3 (the
Doe plaintiffs) seek redress in the form of money damages from defendants
Backpage.com, LLC; Camarillo Holdings, LLC (f/k/a Village Voice Media
Holdings, LLC); and New Times Media, LLC. The Doe plaintiffs allege that
they were molested and repeatedly raped after being advertised as sexual
wares on defendants’ website, backpage.com (Backpage).
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contend that most of the Doe plaintiffs’ claims are preempted by the
Communications Decency Act (CDA), 47 U.S.C. § 230, and that the
remaining intellectual property claims (unauthorized use of a person’s image
and copyright infringement) fail to state claims upon which relief may be
granted.
BACKGROUND1
Backpage is an online classifieds forum that groups goods and services
advertised for sale by geographic location and subject matter. At issue in this
case is the forum’s adult entertainment section and its subcategory offering
the services of “escorts.” The Doe plaintiffs allege that in the scungy world
of adult entertainment, this section of Backpage is a notorious haven for
promoters of the illicit sex trade, and even more troubling, the trafficking of
children for sex. The Doe plaintiffs contend that Backpage’s business model
depends in large part on the revenues it earns from its involvement in the
trafficking of children. To this end, Backpage is alleged to have structured
its adult entertainment section to lightly camouflage its illegal content to
divert the attention of law enforcement. In support, the Second Amended
Complaint (SAC) marshals the following facts:

On a motion to dismiss, the court accepts as true the well-pleaded
facts of a complaint.
2
1
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● Backpage charges a fee for posting advertisements in the adult
entertainment section (and not in most other licit areas of the
website). The fee for the “adult” ads ranges from $12.00 to $17.00
per posting. Backpage charges an additional fee for each reposting
of an adult ad, and for featuring the ad (with a selection of text and
photos) prominently on the right side of the website.
● Backpage does not require posters in the adult entertainment
section to verify their identity. The website also does not require
that the poster use a registered credit card linked with a name and
address, and accepts anonymous payments in the form of prepaid
credit cards, or pseudo-currencies, such as Bitcoin.
● Backpage does not require a poster to verify the age of an “escort”
whose services are offered on the website. Although the website will
not accept an ad when the poster enters an age of less than 18, it will
permit the poster to immediately re-enter an assumed age.
● Backpage does not require any verification of the telephone
numbers posted in its adult entertainment section. It also permits
users to enter telephone numbers using any combination of
character strokes rather than in the more traceable (by law
enforcement) nominal numbers required in other sections of the
website (such as “twoO13fourFive678niNe” rather than “201-3456789”).
Backpage does not require posters in the adult
entertainment section to use their actual email addresses, but
provides an email forwarding service that protects a poster’s
anonymity.
● Backpage strips out metadata associated with photographs (such as
date, time, geolocation and other identifying information) before
publishing the photographs on its website. This prevents law
enforcement from effectively searching for repostings of the same
photograph.
● While Backpage bars the use of certain words and phrases through
its “automatic filtering” system, such as “barely legal,” “high
school,” “innocent,” “sex,” “blow job,” “hand job,” “schoolgirl,”
“teen”, and “teenage,” it readily permits the use of suggestive
3
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circumlocutions like “girl,” “young,” “underage,” and “fresh.” It also
does not filter out easily recognizable abbreviations of forbidden
words, such as “brly legal” or “high schl.”
The Doe plaintiffs further allege that defendants have waged a phony
war against sex traffickers to divert attention from their illegal activities.
While Backpage claims that its adult entertainment advertisements are
screened by trained moderators, it has refused to install readily available
technology that would far more accurately detect the trafficking of children.
According to the Second Amended Complaint, Backpage’s highly touted
claim to make regular referrals to the National Center of Missing & Exploited
Children has led to few instances of identification or rescue. Although
Backpage will on request remove an offending ad in the geographic location
in which it is posted, it does nothing to report or remove the identical ad
posted in other geographical areas, or other ads involving the same child.
The overall effect, the Doe plaintiffs contend, is to create a Potemkin-like
“façade of concern” that obscures the shady source of its filthy lucre. SAC ¶
34.
Jane Doe No. 1, Jane Doe No. 2, and Jane Doe No. 3 aver that they have
been each personally harmed by defendants’ unsavory business practices.
Jane Doe No. 1 was first trafficked by pimps on Backpage after running away
from home in February of 2012, when she was 15 years old. She was again
4
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sold on Backpage in March of 2013, after she ran away a second time.
Between June of 2013 and September 10, 2013, her “services” were
advertised on Backpage each and every day. As a result of the ads, she
engaged in 10 to 12 sex transactions daily with adult men in Massachusetts
and Rhode Island. Her pimp moved her from town to town every two days
to avoid detection. Jane Doe No. 1 appeared on some 300 ads on Backpage
and was raped over 1,000 times.
Backpage listed each ad featuring Jane Doe No. 1 as an offer of “escort”
services, a common euphemism for prostitution. The Jane Doe No. 1 ads
included known signifiers for child prostitution such as “young,” “girl,”
“fresh,” “tiny,” “roses,” and “party.” Jane Doe No. 1’s pimp provided a
prepaid mobile phone and a prepaid credit card to conceal Jane Doe No. 1’s
identity when Jane Doe No. 1 placed ads on Backpage. When Jane Doe No.
1 attempted to enter her true age (which was under 18) during the purchase
of an ad, Backpage would instruct her to enter her age as 18 or older.
Photographs of Jane Doe No. 1 (with her facial features obscured, but at least
on one occasion displaying a unique tattoo) accompanied all of her ads.
Jane Doe No. 2 was trafficked on Backpage by her pimp during various
periods between 2010 and 2012 at different locations in Massachusetts. She
first appeared on Backpage when she was 15 years old, after she had
5
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absconded from a residential program. Ads featuring Jane Doe No. 2 were
posted either by her pimp or an older woman who worked with him (his
“bottom”). The ads would appear on Backpage on average six times a day.
Jane Doe No. 2 was given a prepaid mobile phone to answer calls from
would-be customers generated by the Backpage ads. As a result of the ads,
she was coerced into 5-15 sex transactions every day. Like the ads of Jane
Doe No. 1, those of Jane Doe No. 2 featured her photograph. The ads were
placed using a prepaid credit card. Altogether, Jane Doe No. 2 was raped
over 900 times while in the thrall of her pimp.
Jane Doe No. 3 was trafficked on Backpage in December of 2013 by her
pimp and one or more of his associates. The Backpage solicitations for the
underage Jane Doe No. 3 described her as “new,” “sweet,” and “playful.” As
with the other Jane Does, the ads were paid for with a prepaid credit card.
Jane Doe No. 3 was also given a mobile phone to take calls and texts from
customers. She was taken to a hotel in Foxborough, Massachusetts, where
she was raped by men who responded to the ads. Photos of Jane Doe No. 3,

6
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including one that she had taken of herself, appeared with the ads on
Backpage.2
The Doe plaintiffs brought this lawsuit in October of 2014. In their
Second Amended Complaint, they allege that defendants’ business practices
violate the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008
(TVPRA), 18 U.S.C. § 1595 (Count I); the Massachusetts Anti-Human
Trafficking and Victim Protection Act of 2010 (MATA), Mass. Gen. Laws ch.
265, § 50 (Count II); and constitute unfair and deceptive business practices
under the Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch.
93A, § 9 (Count III). The Doe plaintiffs also bring claims for unauthorized
use of pictures of a person, Mass. Gen. Laws. ch. 214, § 3A and R.I. Gen. Laws
§ 9-1-28 (Count IV), and copyright infringement (specific to the photograph
taken by Jane Doe No. 3 of herself) (Count V).

In January of 2015,

defendants moved to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The parties and several amici curiae3 filed helpful
briefs. The court heard oral argument on April 15, 2015.
At some point, Jane Doe No. 3’s parents became aware of the ads
featuring their daughter on Backpage and demanded that they be taken
down. A week later, the illicit ads still appeared on the website.
2

3 The City and County of San Francisco, the City of Atlanta, the City and

County of Denver, the City of Houston, the City of Philadelphia, and the City
of Portland (Oregon) (collectively the local government amici) and the
7
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DISCUSSION
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the factual allegations of
a complaint must “possess enough heft” to set forth “a plausible entitlement
to relief.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557, 559 (2007); see also
Thomas v. Rhode Island, 542 F.3d 944, 948 (1st Cir. 2008). As the Supreme
Court has emphasized, this standard “demands more than an unadorned,
the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation. A pleading that offers
labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action will not do.

Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked

assertion[s] devoid of further factual enhancement.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Defendants rely primarily on the immunity provided by Congress in
enacting 47 U.S.C. § 230, that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive
computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any
information provided by another information content provider,” id. §
230(c)(1), and the concomitant preemption of “cause[s] of action . . . brought

Commonwealth of Massachusetts submitted two amicus briefs in support of
plaintiffs. The Electronic Frontier Foundation, the Center for Democracy &
Technology, and Professor Eric Goldman (of Santa Clara University School
of Law) (collectively EFF) submitted an amicus brief in support of
defendants.
8
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. . . under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this section.” Id. §
230(e)(3).4 There is no dispute that defendants are, as the operators of
Backpage, providers of an interactive computer service. Defendants contend
that because the Doe plaintiffs allege they were harmed by the contents of
postings that defendants had no part in creating, the claims fall squarely
within Congress’s exemption of interactive computer service providers from
liability for third-party Internet content.
Congress enacted section 230 in 1996, while the Internet was still in its
infancy.

Congress explained the purposes of the law in five pertinent

findings:
(1) The rapidly developing array of Internet and other interactive
computer services available to individual Americans represent
an extraordinary advance in the availability of educational and
informational resources to our citizens.

The Doe plaintiffs argue that the court should first assess the
plausibility and sufficiency of the factual allegations relevant to each claim
before reaching the immunity issue. However, the entitlement to immunity
under section 230 is not only an affirmative defense, but also the right to be
immune from being sued. See, e.g., Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339
F.3d 1119, 1125 (9th Cir. 2003); accord Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d
1354, 1357 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (Section 230 “can [] support a motion to dismiss
if the statute’s barrier to suit is evident from the face of the complaint.”);
Ricci v. Teamsters Union Local 456, 781 F.3d 25, 28 (2d Cir. 2015) (same).
As the Supreme Court counsels, a claim of entitlement to immunity should
be “resolv[ed] . . . at the earliest possible stage in litigation.” Hunter v.
Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991).
4

9
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(2) These services offer users a great degree of control over the
information that they receive, as well as the potential for even
greater control in the future as technology develops.
(3) The Internet and other interactive computer services offer a
forum for a true diversity of political discourse, unique
opportunities for cultural development, and myriad avenues for
intellectual activity.
(4) The Internet and other interactive computer services have
flourished, to the benefit of all Americans, with a minimum of
government regulation.
(5) Increasingly Americans are relying on interactive media for a
variety of political, educational, cultural, and entertainment
services.
47 U.S.C. § 230(a). Consistent with these findings, section 230 reflects the
“policy of the United States”
(1) to promote the continued development of the Internet and
other interactive computer services and other interactive media;
(2) to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that
presently exists for the Internet and other interactive computer
services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation;
(3) to encourage the development of technologies which
maximize user control over what information is received by
individuals, families, and schools who use the Internet and other
interactive computer services;
(4) to remove disincentives for the development and utilization
of blocking and filtering technologies that empower parents to
restrict their children’s access to objectionable or inappropriate
online material; and

10
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(5) to ensure vigorous enforcement of Federal criminal laws to
deter and punish trafficking in obscenity, stalking, and
harassment by means of computer.
Id. § 230(b).
The Doe plaintiffs argue that because the Internet has matured since
the enactment of section 230, the principal policy consideration that
animated Congress (promoting the growth of the Internet by insulating it
from regulatory restrictions and lawsuits) no longer has the assuasive force
that it may once have had. They cite the characterization of section 230’s
immunity guarantee as an affirmative defense in cases like Klayman and
Ricci as evidence that the courts have been whittling back the scope of section
230 immunity as the Internet has shed its training wheels. See Klayman,
753 F.3d at 1357; Ricci, 781 F.3d at 28. The argument, however, does not
bear scrutiny. Both the Klayman and Ricci courts, whatever the label they
used to describe section 230’s effect, found the interactive computer service
providers at issue to be immune from any imputation of liability for thirdparty speech. Klayman, 753 F.3d at 1357-1359; Ricci, 781 F.3d at 27-28.
Moreover, Congress, far from lowering the immunity bar, ratcheted it up in

11
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2010 by expanding the scope of section 230 immunity to preempt the
enforcement of inconsistent foreign judgments. See 28 U.S.C. § 4102(c)(1).5
The local government amici attempt to repackage Backpage as an
“information content provider,” an entity that section 230 defines as “any
person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or
development of information provided through the Internet or any other
interactive computer service.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3). Their ultimate point is
that information content providers are excluded from the immunity granted
by section 230. The amici contend that Backpage generates content by: (1)
posting illegal materials in sponsored ads; (2) stripping metadata from
posted photos; (3) coaching the crafting of ads by allowing misspellings of
suggestive terms; and (4) designing the escorts section of the website in such
a way as to signal to readers that sex with children is sold here. The amici
argument relies heavily on Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v.
Roommates.Com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008). In that case, the Ninth
Section 4102(c)(1) reads as follows: “Notwithstanding any other
provision of Federal or State law, a domestic court shall not recognize or
enforce a foreign judgment for defamation against the provider of an
interactive computer service, as defined in section 230 of the
Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 230) unless the domestic court
determines that the judgment would be consistent with section 230 if the
information that is the subject of such judgment had been provided in the
United States.”
5

12
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Circuit determined Roommates.com, a roommate matching service, to be an
“information content provider” shorn of section 230 immunity because it
elicited information about personal characteristics of users that is forbidden
by the Fair Housing Act. Id. at 1169-1170. The Court reasoned that
Roommate’s connection to the discriminatory filtering process is
direct and palpable: Roommate designed its search and email
systems to limit the listings available to subscribers based on sex,
sexual orientation and presence of children. Roommate selected
the criteria used to hide listings, and Councils allege that the act
of hiding certain listings is itself unlawful under the Fair Housing
Act, which prohibits brokers from steering clients in accordance
with discriminatory preferences.
Id.
To get to its result, the Court in Roommates attempted to draw a line
between active control of the content of a web posting and the provision of a
neutral interactive service that simply replicates offending third-party
matter.6
If an individual uses an ordinary search engine to query for a
“white roommate,” the search engine has not contributed to any
alleged unlawfulness in the individual’s conduct; providing
neutral tools to carry out what may be unlawful or illicit searches
does not amount to “development” for purposes of the immunity
exception. . . . Similarly, a housing website that allows users to
specify whether they will or will not receive emails by means of
user-defined criteria might help some users exclude email from
Roommates is one of the few sentinels denying section 230 immunity
left standing among some 300 cases (as of 2012) that have decided the issue.
See Hill v. StubHub, Inc., 219 N.C. App. 227, 239 (2012).
13
6
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other users of a particular race or sex. However, that website
would be immune, so long as it does not require the use of
discriminatory criteria. A website operator who edits usercreated content – such as by correcting spelling, removing
obscenity or trimming for length – retains his immunity for any
illegality in the user-created content, provided that the edits are
unrelated to the illegality.
Id. at 1169 (bold emphasis added). This latter passage lays out the distinction
that afforded immunity to craigslist.com, an online classifieds forum that
also published discriminatory housing ads. “Nothing in the service craigslist
offers induces anyone to post any particular listing or express a preference
for discrimination; for example, craigslist does not offer a lower price to
people who include discriminatory statements in their postings.” Chicago
Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519
F.3d 666, 671-672 (7th Cir. 2008).
Singly or in the aggregate, the allegedly sordid practices of Backpage
identified by amici amount to neither affirmative participation in an illegal
venture nor active web content creation. Nothing in the escorts section of
Backpage requires users to offer or search for commercial sex with children.
The existence of an escorts section in a classified ad service, whatever its
social merits, is not illegal. The creation of sponsored ads with excerpts
taken from the original posts reflects the illegality (or legality) of the original
posts and nothing more. Similarly, the automatic generation of navigational
14
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path names that identify the ads as falling within the “escorts” category is not
content creation. See Seldon v. Magedson, 2014 WL 1456316, at *5-6 (D.
Ariz. April 15, 2014). The stripping of metadata from photographs is a
standard practice among Internet service providers. Hosting anonymous
users and accepting payments from anonymous sources in Bitcoins,
peppercorns, or whatever, might have been made illegal by Congress, but it
was not.

Backpage’s passivity and imperfect filtering system may be

appropriate targets for criticism, but they do not transform Backpage into an
information content provider.
Although the Doe plaintiffs recognize that defendants did not author
the content of the offending ads, see Opp’n at 16 (“Plaintiffs’ trafficking
claims do not seek to ‘impute’ to [d]efendants any advertisements created by
others”), they challenge the breadth of the immunity sought by defendants.
Count I alleges a violation of a section of the TVPRA, a federal statute that
criminalizes sex trafficking. As the Doe plaintiffs note, section 230 expressly
states that “[n]othing in this section shall be construed to impair the
enforcement of section 223 or 231 of this title, chapter 71 (relating to
obscenity) or 110 (relating to sexual exploitation of children) of Title 18, or
any other Federal criminal statute.”

47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(1) (emphasis

added). Plaintiffs contend that defendants’ business practices, “even if the
15

Add.15

Case: 15-1724 Case
Document:
1:14-cv-13870-RGS
00116911434Document
Page: 91
53 Filed
Date05/15/15
Filed: 11/02/2015
Page 16 of Entry
34 ID: 5950178

advertisements had never been posted,” Opp’n at 16, are sufficient to make
out a violation of the TVPRA. Furthermore, according to the Doe plaintiffs,
section 230 only immunizes “action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict
access to or availability of material that the provider or user considers to be
obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise
objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected.” 47
U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A) (emphasis added). The Doe plaintiffs argue that their
claims are of a different sort – they allege that defendants have intentionally
and in bad faith hidden behind ineffectual counter-trafficking measures to
deflect the scrutiny of law enforcement and social services agencies. Count
II alleges a violation of the MATA, the Massachusetts analog to the TVPRA.
The Doe plaintiffs argue that, because claims under the TVPRA are exempt
from the scope of section 230’s immunity, the claim under MATA does not
depend on “inconsistent state law” preempted by section 230. Count III,
which presses a claim of unfair and deceptive businesses practices under
Massachusetts law, is alleged to arise not from the posted ads and their
contents, but from the architecture of Backpage itself, which the Doe
plaintiffs contend is constructed to conceal illegal activity from law
enforcement. Finally, the Doe plaintiffs rely on Congress’s stricture that
section 230 “shall not be construed to limit or expand any law pertaining to
16
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intellectual property,” id. § 230(e)(2), as preserving the intellectual property
claims (unauthorized publicity and copyright infringement).7 I will examine
the viability of each count in turn.
Civil Remedy under the TVPRA
18 U.S.C. § 1595 provides victims of trafficking the right to bring a
private civil action for restitution against “whoever knowingly benefits,
financially or by receiving anything of value from participation in a venture
which that person knew or should have known has engaged in an act in
violation of this chapter.”

The parties dispute whether a civil action

authorized by a criminal statute can be construed as “enforcement of . . . a
Federal criminal statute” exempt from the immunity provided by section
230(e)(1).8

Defendants do not rely on section 230 immunity with respect to the
copyright infringement claim, but contend, to be discussed infra, that it
should be dismissed on other grounds.
7

The Doe plaintiffs, citing Barnes v. Yahoo!, 570 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir.
2009), also contend that their TVPRA claim falls outside of the protections
of section 230 immunity because section 1595 imposes a duty of care on
defendants wholly independent of their role as publishers of speech. In
Barnes, the Ninth Circuit barred a negligent undertaking claim under
Oregon law that sought to hold Yahoo liable for an alleged failure to remove
indecent profiles of a plaintiff that had been posted by her ex-boyfriend
because the claim attempted to impose publisher liability on Yahoo for
content created by a third party. Id. at 1102-1105 (“The word ‘undertaking,’
after all, is meaningless without the following verb. That is, one does not
17
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The

Doe

plaintiffs

maintain

that

the

statutory

language,

“enforce[ing] . . . a Federal criminal statute,” implies more than a
dependence on criminal prosecution alone. See Black’s Law Dictionary (10th
ed. 2014) (to “enforce” is “[t]o give force or effect to” or “[l]oosely, to compel
a person to pay damages for not complying with . . . .”). Further, plaintiffs
contend that civil actions are frequently authorized as part and parcel of the
enforcement regime behind criminal statutes. See Luka v. Procter & Gamble
Co., 785 F. Supp. 2d 712, 719 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (“[C]ivil enforcement
mechanisms [] permit private parties to sue to enforce statutory

merely undertake; one undertakes to do something. And what is the
undertaking that Barnes alleges Yahoo failed to perform with due care? The
removal of the indecent profiles that her former boyfriend posted on Yahoo’s
website. But removing content is something publishers do, and to impose
liability on the basis of such conduct necessarily involves treating the liable
party as a publisher of the content it failed to remove.”).
The Court did, however, allow a claim of promissory estoppel to stand
on the allegation that a Director of Communications at Yahoo had contacted
plaintiff and promised to remove the offending ads, but failed to do so in a
timely manner. Id. at 1107-1109. “Contract liability here would come not
from Yahoo’s publishing conduct, but from Yahoo’s manifest intention to be
legally obligated to do something, which happens to be removal of material
from publication.” Id. at 1107. There is no claim by the Doe plaintiffs that
any such assurance was given to them by Backpage. As Barnes illustrates,
the existence of a statutory remedy without more does not give rise mirabile
dictu to a tort duty. If it did, there would no need to create such a remedy in
the first place.
18
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prohibitions.” (emphasis added)). Plaintiffs also rely on dicta in Nieman v.
Versuslaw, Inc., 2012 WL 3201931, at *9 (C.D. Ill. Aug. 3, 2012), surmising
that section 230 “arguably . . . may not be used to bar a civil RICO claim
because that would impair the enforcement of a Federal criminal statute.”
Defendants, for their part, point out that courts have consistently
rejected this argument in a section 230 immunity context. In Doe v. Bates,
2006 WL 3813758 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 27, 2006), the court held that Yahoo could
not be held civilly liable for allegedly knowingly hosting child pornography
on a user site styled as the Candyman e-group. The Magistrate Judge
examined “th[is] issue of first impression” in scholarly detail that is worth
quoting at length. Id., at *3.
The plain text of the statute establishes that the 230(e)(1)
exception does not encompass private civil claims. As argued by
Defendant, the common definition of the term “criminal,” as well
as its use in the context of Section 230(e)(1), specifically excludes
and is distinguished from civil claims. The term “criminal” is
defined as “[c]onnected with the administration of penal justice.”
Black’s Law Dictionary 302; see also American Heritage
Dictionary of the English Language 430 (4th ed. 2000) (defining
“criminal” as “[r]elating to the administration of penal law”).
The term “civil” is defined as follows: “[o]f or relating to private
rights and remedies that are sought by action or suit, as distinct
from criminal proceedings.” Black’s Law Dictionary 262
(emphasis added). In addition, Congress’ use of the word
“enforcement” in Section 230(e)(1) again confirms that the
exception refers to governmental action, not civil actions by a
private litigant.
19
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Congress did not bifurcate any statutes as asserted by Plaintiffs.
Rather, as noted by Defendant, it preserved the ability of law
enforcement officials to enforce the federal criminal laws to their
fullest extent while at the same time eliminating the ability of
private plaintiffs to pursue service-provider defendants. Given
the complexity of Title 18 and the availability of civil remedies in
statutes throughout the criminal code, Congress achieved its
intended result using simple language making it clear that
Section 230’s limits on civil liability would not affect
governmental enforcement of federal criminal laws.
As noted by Defendant, Plaintiffs’ invocation of Section 230(e)(1)
rests on their generalized policy arguments rather than the text
of the statute. Plaintiffs’ core argument appears to be that
Section 230(e)(1) must exempt civil claims under the child
pornography statutes because child pornography is “not to be
tolerated” and “[i]f the prospect of civil liability provides a
disincentive for engaging in child pornography over and above
that provided by the prospect of fines and jail time, then that is a
good thing.”
Child pornography obviously is intolerable, but civil immunity
for interactive service providers does not constitute “tolerance”
of child pornography any more than civil immunity from the
numerous other forms of harmful content that third parties may
create constitutes approval of that content. Section 230 does not
limit anyone’s ability to bring criminal or civil actions against the
actual wrongdoers, the individuals who actually create and
consume the child pornography. Here, both the neighbor [who
created the child pornography] and the moderator of the
Candyman web site have been prosecuted and are serving
sentences in federal prison. Further, the section 230(e)(1)
exemption permits law enforcement authorities to bring criminal
charges against even interactive service providers in the event
that they themselves actually violate federal criminal laws.
Regarding civil liability, however, Congress decided not to allow
private litigants to bring civil claims based on their own beliefs
that a service provider’s actions violated the criminal laws. As
20
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Defendant explained in its briefing, the reason is evident. If civil
liability were possible, the incentive to bring a civil claim for the
settlement value could be immense, even if a plaintiff’s claim was
without merit. Even if it ultimately prevailed, the service
provider would face intense public scrutiny and substantial
expense. Given the millions of communications that a service
provider such as Defendant enables, the service provider could
find itself a defendant in numerous such cases. Congress
determined that it wanted to eliminate the resulting
disincentives to the development of vibrant and diverse services
involving third-party communication, while maintaining the
ability of criminal prosecutions by the government for violations
of federal criminal law. In sum, Congress did intend to treat civil
and criminal claims differently and carefully crafted Section
230(e)(1) to achieve exactly that result. Plaintiffs’ claim, although
novel, is untenable and without merit.
Id., at *21-22.
The District Judge adopted the Magistrate Judge’s opinion, also noting
that
[t]he legislative history [] buttresses the Congressional policy
against civil liability for internet service providers. One key
proponent of an amendment containing the language of § 230 at
issue explained that “the existing legal system provides a massive
disincentive for the people who might best help us control the
Internet to do so.” 141 Cong. Rec. H8469. Several legislators
identified “obscenity” in particular as material that could be
more freely regulated as a result of the immunity provided by the
statute. Another proponent noted that “[t]here is no way that
any of [the internet service providers], like Prodigy, can take the
responsibility to edit out information that is going to be coming
in to them from all manner of sources onto their bulletin
board. . . . We are talking about . . . thousands of pages of
information every day, and to have that imposition imposed on
them is wrong.” Id. at H8471. The House approved the
amendment by a vote of 410 to 4. Id. at H8478.
21
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Id., at *4. The court concluded that on the basis of this legislative history,
“Congress decided not to allow private litigants to bring civil claims based
on their own beliefs that a service provider’s actions violated the criminal
laws.” Id., at *5.
In M.A. ex rel. P.K. v. Vill. Voice Media Holdings, LLC, 809 F. Supp.
2d 1041 (E.D. Mo. 2011), the court adopted the reasoning of Bates and
rejected the identical argument from plaintiff, a victim of child sex
trafficking, that section 230 carved out an exemption for the civil claim that
she had brought against Backpage under 18 U.S.C. § 1595. Id. at 1055-1056.
Similarly, in Obado v. Magedson, 2014 WL 3778261 (D.N.J. July 31, 2014),
the court rejected plaintiff’s effort to claim private redress for defendants’
alleged criminal conspiracy to violate his rights. Id., at *8. “Even if Plaintiff
had alleged any facts to sustain this claim, the CDA exception for federal
criminal statutes applies to government prosecutions, not to civil private
rights of action under stat[utes] with criminal aspects.” Id.
Although the Doe plaintiffs challenge this line of cases as “flawed,” the
court is persuaded that criminal and civil actions differ in kind and that
section 230 exempts only criminal prosecutions.

Section 1595 itself

recognizes that although a private right of action may be complementary to
22
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government interests in combating trafficking, a civil action primarily
vindicates private interests and must take a back seat to a criminal
prosecution. See 18 U.S.C. § 1595(b)(1) (“Any civil action filed under this
section shall be stayed during the pendency of any criminal action arising out
of the same occurrence in which the claimant is the victim.”). The court also
finds persuasive amici EFF’s argument that only criminal prosecutions are
exempted from section 230’s immunity because they are subject to the filter
of prosecutorial discretion and a heightened standard of proof, making them
less likely to have a chilling effect on the freedom of online speech.9
The Doe plaintiffs’ next argument, that section 230 only immunizes
“good faith” efforts to restrict access to offensive materials, has also failed to
find support in the decided cases.

Section 203(c)(1) states that “[n]o

provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the
publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information
content provider.” Section 230(c)(2) further provides that

Defendants also contend that plaintiffs fail to make out a case under
18 U.S.C. § 1595 because they do not allege that defendants shared the
traffickers’ criminal intent. Plaintiffs counter that section 1595 imposes
liability not only for aiding and abetting, but more broadly for “participation
in a venture which that person knew or should have known has engaged in
an act in violation of this chapter.” Id. § 1595(a) (emphasis added). The court
need not decide this issue because it holds that this claim is preempted by
section 230 immunity.
23
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[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be
held liable on account of –
(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict
access to or availability of material that the provider or user
considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively
violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not
such material is constitutionally protected; or
(B) any action taken to enable or make available to
information content providers or others the technical means to
restrict access to material described in paragraph (1).
Where section 230(c)(1) exempts an interactive service provider from
liability for publishing third-party content, section 230(c)(2) also immunizes
these providers from liability for actions taken in good faith to restrict
offensive content.
[Section] 230(c)(1) contains no explicit exception for
impermissible editorial motive, whereas § 230(c)(2) does
contain a “good faith” requirement for the immunity provided
therein. That § 230(c)(2) expressly provides for a good faith
element omitted from § 230(c)(1) indicates that Congress
intended not to import a subjective intent/good faith limitation
into § 230(c)(1). “[W]here Congress includes particular language
in one section of a statute but omits it in another . . . , it is
generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and
purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.” Keene Corp.
v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 208 [] (1993). Accordingly, the
text of the two subsections of § 230(c) indicates that (c)(1)’s
immunity applies regardless of whether the publisher acts in
good faith.

24

Add.24

Case: 15-1724 Case
Document:
1:14-cv-13870-RGS
00116911434 Document
Page: 100
53 Filed
Date05/15/15
Filed: 11/02/2015
Page 25 of 34
Entry ID: 5950178

Levitt v. Yelp! Inc., 2011 WL 5079526, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 2011), aff’d,
765 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 2014).10
Unfair and Deceptive Business Practices
The Doe plaintiffs contend that the claim for unfair and deceptive
business practices under the Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act, Gen.
Laws ch. 93, § 9, survives section 230 immunity because it does not depend
on the content of the advertisements themselves, but rather on the
“deceptive” design of Backpage. Without the offending ads, however, no
nexus would exist between Backpage and the harms suffered by the Doe
plaintiffs. Their theory – that absent the permissive website design and
imperfect filtering, their pimps would not have trafficked them or, if they had
attempted to do so, law enforcement would have scrutinized Backpage more
closely and would possibly have intervened to prevent their injuries – is too
speculative to fall as a matter of law within the penumbra of reasonably
foreseeability.
Moreover, courts have repeatedly rejected this “entire website” theory
as inconsistent with the substance and policy of section 230. In Universal

Because the CDA immunizes Backpage from private litigants seeking
redress under civil law, the parallel state law claim under the MATA is
necessarily inconsistent with, and therefore preempted by, the CDA.
25
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Commc’n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413 (1st Cir. 2007), the First
Circuit refused to hold Lycos (a search engine) liable for the “construct and
operation” of its website.

Id. at 422.

“Lycos’s decision not to reduce

misinformation by changing its web site policies was as much an editorial
decision with respect to that misinformation as a decision not to delete a
particular posting. Section 230 immunity does not depend on the form that
decision takes.” Id.; see also StubHub, Inc., 219 N.C. App. at 245 (rejecting
the “entire website” approach in determining whether the Internet ticket
marketplace may be held responsible for scalpers’ unfair or deceptive trade
practices); Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d
250, 257 (4th Cir. 2009) (finding a “structure and design” approach
inapplicable where, unlike in Roommates, the design of website did not
“require[] users to input illegal content as a necessary condition of use.”).11
Also problematic is the suggestion that either knowledge or tacit
encouragement of illegal content (but not the content itself) can be the basis

Court have also rejected consumer protection claims under section
230(c)(1) that seek to hold interactive service providers liable for third-party
content. See, e.g., Lycos, 478 F.3d at 421-422 (Florida securities and
cyberstalking laws); Hinton v. Amazon.com, 2014 WL 6982628, at *1 (S.D.
Miss. Dec. 9, 2014) (Mississippi Consumer Protection Act); Obado, 2014 WL
3778261, at *1 (New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act); Goddard v. Google, 2008
WL 5245490, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2008) (California Unfair Competition
Law).
26
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for interactive web services liability. “It is, by now, well established that
notice of the unlawful nature of the information provided is not enough to
make it the service provider’s own speech.” Lycos, 478 F.3d at 420; see also
Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 332 (4th Cir. 1997) (“The simple fact
of notice surely cannot transform one from an original publisher to a
distributor in the eyes of the law.”). Moreover,
there is simply no authority for the proposition that [encouraging
the publication of defamatory content] makes the website
operator responsible, in whole or in part, for the ‘creation or
development’ of every post on the site. . . . Unless Congress
amends the [CDA], it is legally (although perhaps not ethically)
beside the point whether defendants refuse to remove the
material, or how they might use it to their advantage.
Ascentive, LLC v. Opinion Corp., 842 F. Supp. 2d 450, 476 (E.D.N.Y. 2011)
(internal quotation marks omitted, ellipsis in original). Indeed,
an encouragement test would inflate the meaning of
“development” to the point of eclipsing the immunity from
publisher-liability that Congress established. Many websites not
only allow but also actively invite and encourage users to post
particular types of content. Some of this content will be
unwelcome to others – e.g., unfavorable reviews of consumer
products and services, allegations of price gouging, complaints of
fraud on consumers, reports of bed bugs, collections of ceaseand-desist notices relating to online speech. And much of this
content is commented upon by the website operators who make
the forum available. Indeed, much of it is “adopted” by website
operators, gathered into reports, and republished online. Under
an encouragement test of development, these websites would
lose the immunity under the CDA and be subject to hecklers’
suits aimed at the publisher. Moreover, under the district court’s
27
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rule, courts would then have to decide what constitutes
“encouragement” in order to determine immunity under the
CDA – a concept that is certainly more difficult to define and
apply than the Ninth Circuit’s material contribution test. See
Zeran, 129 F.3d at 333. Congress envisioned an uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open internet, see § 230(a)(1)-(5), but the
muddiness of an encouragement rule would cloud that vision.
Accordingly, other courts have declined to hold that websites
were not entitled to the immunity furnished by the CDA because
they selected and edited content for display, thereby encouraging
the posting of similar content.
Jones v. Dirty World Entm’t Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d 398, 414-415 (6th
Cir. 2014).12
Right of Publicity
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 214, § 3A, provides that
[a]ny person whose name, portrait or picture is used within the
commonwealth for advertising purposes or for the purposes of
trade without his written consent may bring a civil action in the
superior court against the person so using his name, portrait or
picture, to prevent and restrain the use thereof; and may recover
damages for any injuries sustained by reason of such use.
R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-28 provides in almost identical language that
[a]ny person whose name, portrait, or picture is used within the
state for commercial purposes without his or her written consent
Defendants also argue that the Chapter 93A claim, in so far as it is
based on alleged misrepresentations to law enforcement and social services
agencies, lacks an essential foundational element because law enforcement
and social services agencies have no connection in a commercial context to
defendants as “consumers” of goods and services.
12
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may bring an action in the superior court against the person so
using his or her name, portrait, or picture to prevent and restrain
the use thereof, and may recover damages for any injuries
sustained by reason of such use.
Accepting, dubitante, the Doe plaintiffs’ assertion that the right to publicity
constitutes an intellectual property claim exempt from immunity under
section 230,13 the court agrees with defendants that plaintiffs have not pled
Although certain publicity rights are akin to “intellectual property”
rights, a person’s image is not a “product of the human intellect.” Black’s
Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). “[T]he right of publicity flows from the right
to privacy,” Alvarez Guedes v. Marcano Martinez, 131 F. Supp. 2d 272, 278
(D.P.R. 2001) (citing numerous cases), which is an intangible right of a
different nature. Despite the Doe plaintiffs’ attorney’s contention at oral
argument that a photograph may be copyrightable, it does not follow that the
underlying image is ipso facto protectable under intellectual property law.
See Meshwerks, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 528 F.3d 1258, 1264
(10th Cir. 2008) (“Recognizing that Oscar Wilde’s inimitable visage does not
belong, or ‘owe its origins’ to any photographer, the Supreme Court noted
that photographs may well sometimes lack originality and are thus not per
se copyrightable. . . . [P]hotographs are copyrightable, if only to the extent of
their original depiction of the subject. Wilde’s image is not copyrightable;
but to the extent a photograph reflects the photographer’s decisions
regarding pose, positioning, background, lighting, shading, and the like,
those elements can be said to ‘owe their origins’ to the photographer, making
the photograph copyrightable, at least to that extent.”), citing Burrow-Giles
Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 59 (1884). Courts also disagree as
to whether state law intellectual property claims are exempted under section
230. Compare Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1119 (9th Cir.
2007) (“In the absence of a definition from Congress, we construe the term
“intellectual property” to mean ‘federal intellectual property.’”) with Doe v.
Friendfinder Network, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 288, 302 (D.N.H. 2008)
29
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plausible claims for unauthorized use of their images. Plaintiffs do not allege
that defendants used their images to extract any direct benefit (such as
featuring plaintiffs on advertisements for Backpage). Rather, the allegation
is that defendants benefitted incidentally from the fee charged for posting
advertisements with the Doe plaintiffs’ pictures in the escorts section of the
website.

The argument, however, has been explicitly rejected by the

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court.14
[T]the crucial distinction under G.L. c. 214, s 3A, must be
between situations in which the defendant makes an incidental
use of the plaintiff’s name, portrait or picture and those in which
the defendant uses the plaintiff’s name, portrait or picture
deliberately to exploit its value for advertising or trade purposes.
Tropeano v. Atl. Monthly Co., 379 Mass. 745, 749 (1980). “‘The fact that the
defendant is engaged in the business of publication, for example of a
newspaper, out of which he makes or seeks to make a profit, is not enough to
make the incidental publication a commercial use of the name or likeness.’”

(“[Section] 230(e)(2) applies simply to ‘any law pertaining to intellectual
property,’ not just federal law.”).
“[A]s a federal court considering state law claims, we must apply the
state’s law on substantive issues and ‘we are bound by the teachings of the
state’s highest court.’” Phoung Luc v. Wyndham Mgmt. Corp., 496 F.3d 85,
88 (1st Cir. 2007), citing N. Am. Specialty Ins. Co. v. Lapalme, 258 F.3d 35,
37-38 (1st Cir. 2001).
14
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Id., quoting Nelson v. Maine Times, 373 A.2d 1221, 1224 (Me. 1977) (in turn
quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652C, cmt. d (1977)); see also
Intercity Maint. Co. v. Local 254 Serv. Employees Int’l Union, 62 F. Supp.
2d 483, 506 (D.R.I. 1999), aff’d in part, vacated in part on other grounds,
remanded sub nom. Intercity Maint. Co. v. Local 254, Serv. Employees Int’l
Union AFL-CIO, 241 F.3d 82 (1st Cir. 2001) (“The Rhode Island legislature
borrowed the Privacy Act’s scheme of four privacy torts, including the tort of
false light, from the doctrine of privacy torts promulgated by the
Restatement (Second) of Torts. See Liu v. Striuli, 36 F. Supp. 2d 452, 479
(D.R.I. 1999); Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 652B-E (establishing the
four privacy torts). Accordingly, Rhode Island courts have often turned to
the Restatement as an authority on the matter of privacy torts.”).
Copyright Infringement
Jane Doe No. 3 obtained a registration for her photograph on
December 18, 2014, after this lawsuit was filed. Although registration is not
a jurisdictional prerequisite of bringing a suit for copyright infringement,
Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 166 (2010), it is a “condition
precedent for obtaining certain remedies, such as statutory damages and
attorneys’ fees.” Johnson v. Gordon, 409 F.3d 12, 20 (1st Cir. 2005); see also
17 U.S.C § 412 (“[N]o award of statutory damages or of attorney’s fees . . .
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shall be made for – (1) any infringement of copyright in an unpublished work
commenced before the effective date of its registration.”).
The only recovery remaining open to Jane Doe No. 3 is compensatory
damages under 17 U.S.C. § 504. Section 504 permits recovery of “the actual
damages suffered by [] her as a result of the infringement, and any profits of
the infringer that are attributable to the infringement and are not taken into
account in computing the actual damages.” With respect to the latter, Jane
Doe No. 3 alleges that “[t]he Backpage Defendants derive a financial benefit
directly attributable to the public display of such photographs by virtue of
the payment of fees by the pimps and traffickers to Backpage.com.” SAC ¶
139.

However, she may only recover profits from defendants that are

causally linked to specific acts of infringement. See On Davis v. The Gap,
Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 159-161 (2d Cir. 2001). Here no plausible link exists
between defendants’ generalized profits and any common-law copyright
vesting in Jane Doe No. 3’s photo for the simple reason that the fee for
posting an ad is the same whether or not it includes a photograph. Jane Doe
No. 3 does not allege that she suffered any loss of revenues or licensing fees
for her photo as a result of the infringement (nor does she allege that the
protectable elements of the photo, see n.12 supra, have any market value).

32

Add.32

Case: 15-1724 Case
Document:
1:14-cv-13870-RGS
00116911434 Document
Page: 108
53 Filed
Date05/15/15
Filed: 11/02/2015
Page 33 of 34
Entry ID: 5950178

Because she does not plead any redressable damages, Jane Doe No. 3’s
copyright infringement claim must also be dismissed.
***
To avoid any misunderstanding, let me make it clear that the court is
not unsympathetic to the tragic plight described by Jane Doe No. 1, Jane Doe
No. 2, and Jane Doe No. 3. Nor does it regard the sexual trafficking of
children as anything other than an abhorrent evil. Finally, the court is not
naïve – I am fully aware that sex traffickers and other purveyors of illegal
wares ranging from drugs to pornography exploit the vulnerabilities of the
Internet as a marketing tool. Whether one agrees with its stated policy or
not (a policy driven not simply by economic concerns, but also by
technological and constitutional considerations), Congress has made the
determination that the balance between suppression of trafficking and
freedom of expression should be struck in favor of the latter in so far as the
Internet is concerned. Putting aside the moral judgment that one might pass
on Backpage’s business practices, this court has no choice but to adhere to
the law that Congress has seen fit to enact.
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ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion to dismiss the Second
Amended Complaint is ALLOWED. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment
accordingly and close this case.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Richard G. Stearns
__________________________
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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